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A BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE: THE USE 
OF BURDEN-SHIFTING DEVICES IN 
CRIMINAL CYBERHARASSMENT LAW 
Abstract: As communication using the Internet and electronic media be-
comes more prevalent, incidents of online harassment have likewise in-
creased. In recent years, the U.S. Congress and state legislatures have en-
acted new legislation and amended existing criminal statutes to target 
cyberharassment, also called cyberstalking or cyberbullying. The definition 
of cyberharassment consequently varies between jurisdictions, particularly 
with regard to statutory emphasis on the mental state of the accused and 
the reaction of the victim. This Note argues that the reasonableness and 
specific intent standards employed by most cyberharassment laws are in-
adequate to balance the safety interests of victims and the First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of electronic speakers. The Note proposes that 
cyberharassment statutes be supplemented with burden-shifting devices 
such as affirmative defenses and nonmandatory presumptions, which have 
historically been employed in other contexts where the prosecution is pro-
cedurally disadvantaged and the details of the crime are peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the accused. After surveying statutes that have success-
fully incorporated burden-shifting elements, the Note concludes that real-
locating evidentiary burdens increases the efficiency and fairness of cyber-
harassment law while reconciling the interests of both the victim and the 
accused. 
Introduction 
 “I’m your worst nightmare. Your troubles are just beginning.”1 
 In May 1998, Taryn Pream, a young woman in Thief River Falls, 
Minnesota, received this message, accompanied by pornographic pic-
tures, in a series of threatening e-mails sent over a period of three weeks 
from an anonymous address.2 For Pream and law enforcement officials, 
stopping the online harassment seemed unlikely.3 She had no way of 
identifying the sender, who appeared to have intimate knowledge of her 
personal life, and her Internet Service Provider (ISP) could only inform 
                                                                                                                      
1 Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current 
State and Federal Laws, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 125, 125 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 Jaime DeLage, Shut the Door TRF Girl Starts Internet Safety Guide, Grand Forks Her-
ald, Jan. 26, 1999, at A1. 
3 See id. 
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her that the messages originated from her hometown.4 Any other in-
formation would require at least two weeks and a search warrant.5 
Pream grew reclusive and paranoid, obsessing about locking doors and 
windows.6 She ultimately tracked down the culprit, not with the assis-
tance of police, but because the sender forwarded several obscene pho-
tographs through his friends’ e-mail accounts.7 One of these individuals 
helped Pream identify her harasser—a fellow classmate at school.8 
 At the time of Pream’s ordeal, her efforts to locate the guilty party 
were impeded by local authorities’ inexperience with the Internet and 
harassment committed via electronic media.9 Federal and state law has 
progressed significantly since 1998, with over forty states enacting stat-
utes that criminalize cyberbullying, cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and 
other purposeful, threatening online conduct.10 Victims of harassment 
through electronic communications still lack legal remedies, however.11 
The U.S. Congress and state legislatures have attempted to address the 
interests of victims through enacting new legislation or amending exist-
ing stalking and harassment laws; yet criminal statutes that contain pros-
ecution-oriented language or subjective standards of harm risk invalida-
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See DeLage, supra note 2. 
9 See id. (describing Pream’s efforts to stop the harassment by notifying the local sher-
iff, who admitted he had never used the Internet before). 
10 See infra Appendix. 
11 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 140–41. In recent years there have been several widely 
publicized teenage suicides as the result of verbal, physical, and electronic harassment. See, 
e.g., Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers Are Charged After Classmate’s Suicide, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 29, 2010, at A1; Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No 
Charges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2007, at A23. On the rare occasions that these cases have re-
sulted in criminal charges—typically under conventional harassment laws, rather than 
dedicated cyberharassment statutes—ensuing prosecutions have generally been unsuccess-
ful. For example, in 2006, thirteen-year-old Megan Meier committed suicide after she was 
harassed on MySpace by a neighborhood mother named Lori Drew, who befriended and 
then attacked Meier while posing as a sixteen-year-old boy. Maag, supra. Drew was charged 
with criminal violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), but was ultimately 
acquitted by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in 2009. See Unit-
ed States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 468 (C.D. Cal 2009). More recently, fifteen-year-old 
Phoebe Prince took her own life after months of online and physical bullying by classmates 
in South Hadley, Massachusetts. Eckholm & Zezima, supra. Although Prince’s death has 
motivated the Massachusetts legislature to enact a new state anti-bullying law and felony 
charges have been filed against her alleged harassers, some legal experts believe that the 
criminal charges are too harsh for high school students and will likely be reduced or dis-
missed. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Strategies Take Shape for Trials in Bully Case, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 16, 2010, at A19. 
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tion for impinging on First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms.12 
Conversely, statutes that feature conservative requirements for convic-
tion impose overwhelming evidentiary burdens upon prosecutors and 
permit the harasser to continue his or her harmful conduct at the ex-
pense of the victim’s psychological and even physical well-being.13 Iden-
tifying an appropriate balance between the interests of both the victim 
and the accused is therefore essential to ensuring the efficacy and con-
stitutionality of current and future cyberharassment legislation.14 
 This Note examines the statutory strategies employed in federal 
and state cyberharassment laws and proposes that burden-shifting de-
vices, already well established in other areas of penal law, have unique 
utility for cybercrimes, where anonymous or pseudonymous communi-
cations disadvantage victims and law enforcement.15 Part I explores the 
nature and consequences of the offense of cyberharassment and how 
civil immunity for ISPs disincentivizes their disclosure of subscriber 
identities, even those belonging to individuals who promulgate obscene 
or objectionable content.16 Part II examines existing criminal cyberhar-
assment laws and discusses why commonly used statutory elements, 
such as standards of reasonableness and specific intent, fail to strike an 
adequate balance between the privacy concerns and personal safety of 
the victim, and the free speech and due process rights of the alleged 
harasser.17 Part III then analyzes the utilitarian benefits, constitutional 
arguments, and underlying policies of burden-shifting devices, particu-
larly affirmative defenses and nonmandatory presumptions.18 This Part 
then proposes that reallocation of evidentiary burdens between the 
prosecution and the defendant in cyberharassment legislation is a 
promising method of reconciling the interests of both the victim and 
the accused.19 Finally, the Appendix includes all current state and fed-
eral cyberharassment statutes, their constituent elements, and the result 
of any constitutional challenges.20 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 141, 144; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace 
from the Listener’s Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 
1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 377, 421. 
13 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 135–36, 138, 143; Joseph C. Merschman, Note, The Dark 
Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary Legislation, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
255, 269 (2001). 
14 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 133–34, 139. 
15 See infra notes 88–257 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 21–68 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 69–126 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 127–164 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 165–257 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Appendix. 
292 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:289 
I. The Crime of Cyberharassment 
A. The Consequences and Legal Difficulties of Cyberharassment 
 The terms “cyberharassment,” “cyberbullying,” and “cyberstalk-
ing” have no universally accepted definition and are often used inter-
changeably.21 Legal scholars generally distinguish the terms by demo-
graphics: cyberbullying22 entails the victimization of minors by other 
minors, whereas cyberstalking23 and cyberharassment involve harass-
ment between adults.24 Nevertheless, all three offenses involve un-
                                                                                                                      
21 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 126. 
22 Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. Tol. L. Rev. 51, 56 (2005) (citing Cy-
berbullying.ca, http://www.cyberbullying.ca (last visited Jan. 21, 2011)). Cyberbullying 
refers to the “use of information and communication technologies such as e-mail, cell 
phone and pager text messages, instant messaging, defamatory personal Web sites, and 
defamatory online personal polling Web sites, to support deliberate, repeated, and hostile 
behavior by an individual or group, that is intended to harm others.” Id. Studies have 
shown that cyberbullying tends to peak in middle school and decline in high school, with 
roughly twenty-five percent of students engaging in or being victimized by some form of 
Internet harassment. Kirk R. Williams & Nancy G. Guerra, Prevalence and Predictors of Inter-
net Bullying, 41 J. Adolescent Health S14, S15, S20 (2007). Notably, prevalence rates of 
cyberbullying in the United States vary widely between studies, ranging from 6% to as high 
as 42% of middle and high school students. Jing Wang et al., School Bullying Among Adoles-
cents in the United States: Physical, Verbal, Relational, and Cyber, 45 J. Adolescent Health 368, 
374 (2009). 
Although cyberbullying typically alludes to repetitive, aggressive conduct initiated by 
children or teenagers towards their peers, by some definitions adults can also engage in 
cyberbullying towards children or other adults. See Dickerson, supra, at 51 (describing in-
cidents of cyberbullying among law students); Andrew M. Hendersen, Note, High-Tech 
Words Do Hurt: A Modern Makeover Expands Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic 
Communications, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 379, 381 (2009) (explaining that although cyberbullying 
typically involves repetitive, controlling acts by juveniles, adults can also engage in similar 
behavior). Cyberbullying scholarship frequently focuses on student speech rights on 
school grounds, the authority of school administrators to regulate that speech, and other 
civil remedies. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra, at 51; Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyber-
bullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1641, 1645–47 
(2009). Notwithstanding its equal relevance, noncriminal cyberharassment is beyond the 
scope of this Note, which focuses exclusively on penal statutes. See infra Appendix. 
23 U.S. Att’y Gen., 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and In-
dustry, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 1999), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
cyberstalking.htm [hereinafter 1999 Report on Cyberstalking]. Cyberstalking involves “the use 
of the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic communications devices to stalk or harass an-
other person.” Id. Cyberstalking is often characterized by repeated predatory behavior or 
patterns of conduct, which may be accompanied by credible threats of serious harm. 
Goodno, supra note 1, at 126 n.6. The CyberAngels, an anti-cyberstalking nonprofit or-
ganization, estimates that at least sixty-three thousand online stalkers currently operate in 
the United States alone. Id. at 156. 
24 See Hendersen, supra note 22, at 381 (describing cyberbullying as harassment or hu-
miliation of children, preteens, and teenagers); What Is Cyberbullying, Exactly?, Stop cyberbul-
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wanted, repetitious conduct committed through the use of the Inter-
net, cell phone, or other electronic media, with the intent to frighten 
or harass another person.25 Given their similar characteristics, these 
terms will be subsumed under the term “cyberharassment” for the 
purposes of this Note.26 
 Cyberharassment differs in scope from offline harassment in that 
the Internet provides an anonymous and relatively unregulated envi-
ronment where communications can be transmitted instantaneously to 
a global audience.27 Acts of harassment range from gossip, taunts, and 
exclusion to explicit sexual harassment, intimidation, or threats.28 Ha-
rassers utilize social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, and Lin-
kedIn, instant messaging, message boards, cell phone text messaging, 
pagers, and other electronic media to affect their victims over great dis-
tances and with minimal effort.29 Technically savvy harassers may use e-
mail programs that automatically send messages at regular intervals, 
overwhelming the victim’s inbox.30 
 Additionally, harassers can easily obtain the victim’s personal in-
formation, such as his or her e-mail address, mailing address, or social 
security number, and then use this information to intensify their threat-
                                                                                                                      
lying, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (“Once adults 
become involved, it is plain and simple cyber-harassment or cyberstalking. Adult cyber-
harassment or cyberstalking is NEVER called cyberbullying.”). Cyberbullying and cyberstalking 
have also been differentiated according the types of laws that address them, with cyberstalking 
targeted by stalking laws and cyberbullying by harassment laws. See Hendersen, supra note 22, 
at 381. 
25 See Dickerson, supra note 22, at 56; Goodno, supra note 1, at 126. 
26 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23; Dickerson, supra note 22, at 56. 
27 See Williams & Guerra, supra note 22, at S15. The Internet is a particularly popular 
medium of social interaction for over forty-five million children and teenagers in the Unit-
ed States, who can operate online with more autonomy and less oversight by adults. Id. 
28 Janis Wolak et al., Does Online Harassment Constitute Bullying? An Exploration of Online 
Harassment by Known Peers and Online-Only Contacts, 41 J. Adolescent Health S51, S51 
(2007) (citing J. Patchin & S. Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look 
at Cyberbullying, 4 Youth Violence & Juv. Just. 148 (2006)) (subsuming behaviors such as 
“bothering someone online, teasing in a mean way, calling someone hurtful names, inten-
tionally leaving persons out of things, threatening someone and saying unwanted, sexually 
related things to someone” under the act of online harassment). 
29 See Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the On-
line Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 845, 850 (2010) (“[A]n 
Internet-created communication can be widely distributed at the click of a mouse and 
accessed by not only the bully and target but endless other users as well, particularly if an 
e-mail is forwarded en masse or if comments are posted on a public website.”). 
30 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
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ening conduct,31 engage in identity theft,32 or impersonate the victim 
online.33 Cyberharassment often involves “stalking by proxy,” where ha-
rassers post offensive or inflammatory messages under the victim’s name 
on bulletin boards or in chatrooms, solicit sexual encounters while pos-
ing as the victim on adult personals sites, or otherwise deceive third par-
ties into directing threatening or harassing conduct towards the victim.34 
Like physical stalking, online harassment may lead to more dangerous 
behavior, including physical violence.35 Furthermore, the impersonal 
nature of electronic communications tends to empower perpetrators 
who might not otherwise confront the victim in person or over the tele-
phone and enables them to avoid accountability.36 
 Cyberharassment inflicts significant psychological harm on vic-
tims.37 The anonymous or pseudonymous nature of most electronic 
communications worsens these effects because victims can never be 
certain that they are safe from attack.38 Unlike traditional stalking or 
harassment, cyberharassment can reach the victim at any time and fol-
low them anywhere, including into the home, a traditionally private 
place.39 Cyberharassers can preserve their anonymity with relative ease 
                                                                                                                      
31 See id. (discussing California law enforcement cases in which victims repeatedly re-
ceived the message “187” on their pagers, alluding to the murder statute of the California 
Penal Code). 
32 See Brian Krebs, Hackers’ Latest Target: Social Networking Sites, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 
2008, at A1. (noting that social networking sites have recently become the target of hackers 
and identity thieves, who hijack accounts or trick users into installing malicious software). 
33 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. Certain websites directly assist cyber-
harassers by supplying instructions regarding how to stalk someone or research a social 
security number, home address, or driver’s license number. Amy C. Radosevich, Note, 
Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures Keeping Pace with Today’s Stalker?, 2000 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 1371, 1388. 
34 Tom Zeller, Jr., A Sinister Web Entraps Victims of Cyberstalkers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2006, 
at A1. This behavior was illustrated in the case of Gary S. Dellapenta, a Los Angeles secu-
rity guard who posted rape fantasies in chat rooms and on personals sites under his ex-
girlfriend’s name, along with her home address. Id. Six different men appeared at the 
victim’s apartment in response to the advertisements. Id. Dellapenta was convicted under 
California’s cyberstalking law in 1999. Id. 
35 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
36 See id. 
37 Wang et al., supra note 22, at 369; King, supra note 29, at 851 (listing low self-esteem, 
anxiety, alienation, and suicidal tendencies as possible side effects of online harassment). 
38 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 138 (“[T]he victim may not even know where an ano-
nymous cyberstalker is physically located. For all she knows the cyberstalker may be next 
door, at her workplace, or across the country . . . .”). 
39 See Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to Cyberbully-
ing, 33 Seton Hall Legis. J. 651, 654 (2009) (“[C]yberbullying has no distinct boundaries 
and can reach a victim anytime and anywhere.”); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (holding that the First Amendment does not force individuals to 
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by using different ISPs, supplying ISPs with incorrect identification in-
formation, paying for online services with non-traceable payment me-
thods, or using several different pseudonyms.40 When sending e-mail 
messages, harassers can utilize electronic mail servers that strip away 
identifying information and transport headers.41 By forwarding their 
messages through several such services, they can render their commu-
nications untraceable.42 Consequently, one of the primary hurdles for 
cyberharassment victims and government prosecutors is identifying and 
locating the defendant behind the screen name.43 
B. Subscriber Anonymity and ISP Civil Immunity Under the  
Communications Decency Act 
 In the context of the Internet, anonymous communication is both 
powerful and prevalent.44 In 1995, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commis-
sion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[a]nonymity is a shield from 
the tyranny of the majority.”45 Anonymous communication is protected 
by the Bill of Rights, particularly the First Amendment, for its ability to 
foster robust and uninhibited discourse without fear of retaliation or 
suppression by others.46 There is also no doubt that anonymous speech 
on the Internet receives the same protection under the First Amend-
ment as speech in traditional public fora.47 Unfortunately, cyberharass-
                                                                                                                      
experience unwanted communication in the privacy of the home); Wolak et al., supra note 
28, at S52 (“[T]he nature of the Internet creates the potential for repeated victimization, 
and when harassment is posted online, it may not be easy for a target to terminate the 
situation.”). 
40 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
44 See Dickerson, supra note 22, at 56; Goodno, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
45 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
46 See id. In McIntyre, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Ohio statute that re-
quired political handbills to identify the author or organization responsible for writing or 
distributing them, holding: 
Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the 
interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unques-
tionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition 
of entry. Accordingly, an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an as-
pect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 341–42. 
47 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“As the District Court found, ‘the con-
tent on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.’ We agree with its conclusion that our 
cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to this medium.”); Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on 
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ers frequently take advantage of their anonymity to conceal their true 
identities and locations, inflict additional psychological harm on vic-
tims, and impair attempts at legal prosecution.48 In order for the gov-
ernment to identify and successfully prosecute these offenders, prose-
cutors must first obtain their identification information from ISPs.49 
 ISPs that host e-mail services, social websites, and bulletin boards 
often serve as the “first line of defense” against cyberharassment, pro-
viding filtering options that allow users to block unwanted or unfamil-
iar e-mails, instant messages, or postings to their online profiles.50 ISPs 
typically have policies that prohibit the abuse of their services, and they 
typically retain the right to terminate a user’s account if he or she vio-
lates these policies.51 When cyberharassment escalates beyond these 
initial protective measures, ISPs can also identify specific users and 
their locations based on their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and re-
move objectionable content at the request of petitioning parties.52 ISPs 
have no legal obligation to comply with such requests, however, and 
frequently ignore them, claiming that implementing additional cus-
tomer protection would be costly and inefficient.53 Unlike copyright 
law, where federal statutory authority provides a subpoena power that 
forces ISPs to disclose user information outside the discovery process,54 
ISP liability in the context of cyberharassment is dictated by the Federal 
Communications Decency Act (CDA).55 
                                                                                                                      
Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 833, 839 (2010) 
(“Speech on the internet receives full First Amendment protection, including the right to 
speak anonymously.”). 
48 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
49 See id. 
50 Merschman, supra note 13, at 277. 
51 Id.; see Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Indicted in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. Times, May 
16, 2008, at A1 (describing the indictment of Lori Drew under the CFAA, premised upon 
Drew’s violation of MySpace’s user agreement). 
52 See Turbert, supra note 39, at 678–79. The ability of an ISP to identify subscribers 
based on their IP addresses depends on whether the subscribers supplied the ISPs with 
accurate identification information. See Laurence H. Miller et al., Responding to the Anony-
mous Cyber-Griper, ACCA Docket, May 2002, at 64, 82 (“There is no guarantee, however, 
that John Doe gave [the] ISP the correct information. Ultimately, the information that the 
plaintiff obtains may be worthless.”). Such deception is often overlooked because ISPs 
rarely authenticate or confirm user data so long as they receive payment for their services 
in a timely manner. See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
53 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. ISPs argue that “no attempt to impose 
cyberstalking reporting or response requirements should be made unless fully justified” on 
the grounds that the “decentralized nature of the Internet would make it difficult for pro-
viders to collect and submit such data.” Id. 
54 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006). 
55 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
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 Prior to the enactment of the CDA, ISPs could be found directly, 
vicariously, or contributorily liable for defamatory statements posted on 
their networks, particularly if they exercised any editorial control over 
user postings.56 Only ISPs that acted as a “passive conduit” of informa-
tion could escape liability.57 This rule forced providers to choose be-
tween disregarding offensive content entirely in order to maintain their 
status as a “passive conduit,” or else regulate all content and risk liability 
for any objectionable message that was overlooked.58 Congress enacted 
§ 230 specifically to address this issue.59 
 Section 230 provides two layers of immunity for ISPs.60 First, ser-
vice providers cannot be held liable as speakers, publishers, or distribu-
tors of obscene, harassing, or otherwise objectionable content posted 
by users.61 Even if the ISP possesses the ability to publish, withdraw, or 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5–6 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding ISP defendant liable for defamatory postings on a message board 
because the ISP exercised editorial control and judgment over user messages by imple-
menting an automatic scanning process). 
57 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding 
defendant ISP was not directly or vicariously liable for defamatory statements posted on its 
bulletin board because the ISP exercised little editorial control over the content of its fo-
rums or its third party users); Stratton Oakmont Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (“A distributor 
or deliverer of defamatory material is considered a passive conduit and will not be found 
liable in the absence of fault.”). 
58 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that 
Congress enacted § 230 to remove ISP disincentives for self-regulation or blocking of of-
fensive material, as introduced by the Stratton Oakmont decision); Lisa Guernsey, Telling 
Tales out of School, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2003, at G1 (“As long as Web hosting companies and 
other providers make no attempt to edit what shows up [on] their sites, they cannot be 
sued for what appears on them.”). 
59 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
60 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Section 230(c) of the CDA provides: 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith 
to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user consid-
ers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not, such material is constitutionally pro-
tected; or (B) any action to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material de-
scribed in paragraph (1). 
Id. § 230(c)(1)–(2). 
61 See id. § 230(c)(1). The CDA does not extend ISP immunity to criminal liability. Jo-
anna Lee Mishler, Comment, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the Internet Constitute a 
Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable if It Does?, 17 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 115, 131 (2000). 
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change content on its servers and has knowledge that users have en-
gaged in defamatory or slanderous speech, it cannot be held liable for 
content-based claims under § 230.62 This aspect of immunity protects 
ISPs from all civil claims, including tort and breach of contract claims, 
and typically applies in cases involving defamation, negligence, libel, 
and slander.63 Second, § 230 protects ISPs in their good faith efforts to 
restrict user access to objectionable content, regardless of whether that 
content is normally protected by the First Amendment.64 
 In cases where an ISP refuses to voluntarily reveal the identity of an 
anonymous or pseudonymous subscriber, in the civil context, a cyber-
harassment victim has no option other than to file a “John Doe” lawsuit 
and attempt to compel ISP disclosure through discovery.65 Nevertheless, 
even a victorious “John Doe” suit may not reveal the culprit’s identity if 
the subscriber originally supplied the ISP with false information or the 
ISP already deleted its relevant access logs.66 Although courts have rec-
ognized the importance of anonymous speech with regard to books, 
pamphlets, handbills, and other printed publications, they have found a 
more limited privacy interest in anonymous Internet postings, and must 
balance the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously 
against the right of the plaintiff to protect his or her proprietary inter-
ests and reputation.67 Revealing anonymous speakers may chill legiti-
                                                                                                                      
62 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
63 See, e.g., id. at 330–31 (determining an ISP to be immune from charges of defama-
tion and harassment); Shneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 42 (Wash. Ct App. 2001) 
(acknowledging that courts analyzing the scope of § 230 have found the statute provides 
immunity to civil claims generally). 
64 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
65 See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Maz-
zotta, supra note 47, at 834. In Columbia Insurance Co., a trademark infringement case, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California provided criteria for the discov-
ery of a defendant’s identity from an ISP, explaining that: 
With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious 
acts . . . entirely on-line. The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anony-
mously and may give fictitious or incomplete identifying information. Parties 
who have been injured by these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the 
tortfeasor from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope 
of actually discovering the identity of the tortfeasor. 
185 F.R.D. at 578. 
66 Miller et al., supra note 52, at 82. Conversely, in the field of defamation, it has been 
argued that “unmasking subpoenas” served on ISPs allow plaintiffs to identify anonymous 
defendants too easily, thereby silencing online speakers and possibly exposing them to 
intimidation and retaliation. Mazzotta, supra note 47, at 840, 843. 
67 See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001) (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)) (“Anonymous pamphlets, 
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mate discourse; at the same time, victims must discover defendants’ 
identities in order to have the opportunity to pursue legal relief.68 
II. Federal and State Legislative Approaches to 
Cyberharassment 
A. What Controls: The Perspective of the Victim or of the Harasser? 
 Although forty-six states now include electronic communications 
in their stalking and harassment laws, the status of American cyberhar-
assment law remains inconsistent.69 State statutes feature differing 
causes of action, requisite mental states, and punishments.70 At the fed-
eral level, there are three federal statutes that can be applied to cyber-
harassment: the Interstate Communications Act, 71 the Interstate Stalk-
ing Punishment and Prevention Act (the “Interstate Stalking Act”),72 
                                                                                                                      
leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of man-
kind.”). The Superior Court of New Jersey articulated a four-step test for trial courts con-
templating an order to compel an ISP to disclose the identity of an anonymous Internet 
subscriber: (1) efforts by the plaintiff to notify anonymous posters that they are the subject 
of a subpoena or order for disclosure; (2) identification by the plaintiff of the exact state-
ments made by each anonymous poster that constitute actionable speech; (3) review of the 
complaint and all information provided to the court to determine whether the plaintiff 
has established a prima facie cause of action against the anonymous defendants; and (4) 
balancing the defendant’s right of free speech and the necessity of disclosure of the de-
fendant’s identity. Id. at 760–61. The Dendrite analysis, although influential, is but one of 
several balancing tests employed at the state and federal levels. Mazzotta, supra note 47, at 
846. 
68 Miller et al., supra note 52, at 77; Mazzotta, supra note 47, at 834–35. 
69 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 142; State Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment and Cyberbullying 
Laws, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://www.ncls.org/IssuesResearch/Telecommun- 
icationsInformationTechnology/CyberstalkingLaws/tabid/13495/Default.aspx (last updated 
Dec. 20, 2010). States that have enacted cyberharassment legislation have primarily done 
so by amending existing stalking or harassment laws or expanding their definition of stalk-
ing or harassment to include electronic means of communication. Shonah Jefferson & 
Richard Shafritz, A Survey of Cyberstalking Legislation, 32 UWLA L. Rev. 323, 329 (2001). A 
few states, including Arkansas, Virginia, and Wisconsin, have also introduced new statutes 
specifically targeting unlawful electronic communications. Id. at 330. 
70 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 142. 
71 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006). The Interstate Communications Act criminalizes any 
communication that is transmitted in interstate commerce and contains a threat to injure 
the person of another, which includes communications through telephone, beepers, or 
the Internet. See Goodno, supra note 1, at 148. In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit upheld a conviction under § 875(c) where the defendant sent a bomb threat 
to his girlfriend using AOL’s instant messenger service. See United States v. Kammersell, 
196 F.3d 1137, 1138, 1139 (1999). 
72 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006). At the time of its enactment in 1996, the Interstate Stalk-
ing Act constituted the first federal law to specifically address physical stalking. Goodno, 
supra note 1, at 151, 152. In 2000, Congress amended the statute for the first time via the 
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and the CDA.73 These federal laws have their own limitations because 
they were originally designed to prohibit physical stalking, obscenity, or 
child pornography rather than cyberharassment.74 Additionally, all cy-
berharassment statutes remain vulnerable to constitutional challenges 
for substantial overbreadth or vagueness due to their potential restric-
tions on protected speech.75 
                                                                                                                      
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (the “Victims of Trafficking 
Act”), which changed the statute’s language to target defendants who travel in interstate or 
foreign commerce, regardless of whether the defendant physically moves across state lines. 
See id. at 151. Although the Victims of Trafficking Act did not address whether a person 
could travel in interstate commerce via the Internet, in 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit found a defendant guilty of cyberstalking under § 2261A. See United 
States v. Bowker, 372 F.2d 365, 388 (6th Cir. 2004); Goodno, supra note 1, at 151. 
In January 2006, the Interstate Stalking Act was amended a second time by the Vio-
lence against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 114, 119 Stat. 2960, 2987. See Goodno, supra note 1, at 152. Section 
2261A was expanded to criminalize any course of conduct that causes substantial emo-
tional distress through the defendant’s use of an interactive computer service. See id. 
73 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006). The CDA originated from the Communications Act of 1934, 
which was subsequently amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, § 1, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223). Congress incorporated 
the CDA in title V, section 502 of the Telecommunications Act. See Telecommunications Act 
§ 502. In January 2006, Congress amended the CDA when it enacted VAWA, which modified 
the definition of the term “telecommunications” to include “any device or software that can 
be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmit-
ted, in whole or in part, by the Internet.” See 47 U.S.C. § 223(h)(1)(C). 
74 See King, supra note 29, at 856 (describing the shortcomings of these statutes). For 
example, the Interstate Communications Act is arguably of limited use in cyberharassment 
cases because the statute only applies to overt threats, excluding cases where the cyberhar-
asser indirectly interacts with the victim or causes psychological, rather than bodily, harm. 
See id. 
75 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997). The overbreadth doctrine mandates that 
a statute be struck down if its scope encompasses free expression protected by the First 
Amendment in addition to legitimately forbidden conduct. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“A [] threat is inherent in a penal statute . . . which does not aim 
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps with-
in its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom 
of speech or of the press.”). The void-for-vagueness doctrine raises due process considera-
tions where statutory language is so ambiguously drafted that it fails to provide fair warning 
for potential defendants and encourages arbitrary enforcement. See Merschman, supra note 
13, at 273. Notably, legislatures can criminalize true threats—serious statements that express 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence—because threats do not fall within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (ruling that the 
First Amendment permits states to ban true threats); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 
(1969) (per curiam) (holding that true threats, despite being a form of pure speech, should 
be distinguished from constitutionally protected speech). 
The CDA has been successfully challenged on the constitutional grounds of substantial 
overbreadth. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882–83. In Reno v. ACLU, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the CDA’s prohibition on “indecent” and “patently offensive” communications 
transmitted over the Internet to minor recipients as being facially unconstitutional. Id. Nev-
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 This patchwork of federal and state law generates substantial tech-
nical disparities between jurisdictions, particularly with regard to stat-
utes’ varying emphases on the perspectives of the victim and alleged 
harasser.76 Some legal scholarship suggests that cyberharassment should 
be based on the perception of the victim.77 To illustrate this concept, 
two scholars pose the hypothetical of a secret admirer who sends flow-
ers to a girl to demonstrate his romantic interest.78 If the girl does not 
respond, but nevertheless receives more flowers from her admirer on 
the following day, does this constitute harassment?79 Even though an 
objective observer might consider this culpable behavior, if the victim is 
not upset by the suitor’s attention, then arguably, no crime has been 
committed.80 
 Other commentators counter that measuring the defendant’s cul-
pability according to the subjective effect on the victim conflicts with 
First Amendment principles, particularly when a statute regulates 
speech in addition to conduct.81 In the absence of an objective standard, 
a statute may provide insufficient notice to ordinary citizens of what 
conduct is prohibited, particularly when the law utilizes general terms 
like “annoying,” “harassing,” and “indecent.”82 Such statutes potentially 
could be struck down for being unconstitutionally vague.83 A subjective, 
                                                                                                                      
ertheless, in order to preserve the remainder of the statute, the Court severed the indecency 
provision while preserving the government’s right to prosecute obscenity and child pornog-
raphy. Id. at 883. 
76 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 140–41. 
77 See Diana Lamplugh & Paul Infield, Harmonising Anti-Stalking Laws, 34 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 853, 868 (2003). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See Gene Barton, Note, Taking a Byte out of Crime: E-mail Harassment and the Inefficacy 
of Existing Law, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 465, 481–82 (1995) (using the constitutionality of tele-
phone harassment statutes as guidance for e-mail harassment laws). 
82 See Volokh, supra note 12, at 421. 
83 See State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 220 (Kan. 1996); Volokh, supra note 12, at 421. In 
the 1996 case of State v. Bryan, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down a state stalking law 
as being unconstitutionally vague, explaining: 
The danger in this situation is obvious. In the absence of an objective stan-
dard, the terms “annoys,” “alarms” and “harasses” subject the defendant to 
the particular sensibilities of the individual victim. Different persons have dif-
ferent sensibilities, and conduct which annoys or alarms one person may not 
annoy or alarm another. The victim may be of such a state of mind that con-
duct which would never annoy, alarm, or harass a reasonable person would 
seriously annoy, alarm, or harass this victim. In such a case, the defendant 
would be guilty of stalking . . . even though a reasonable person in the same 
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victim-based standard also disregards the reality that rude, provocative, 
and offensive statements are considered common Internet parlance and 
do not distress most users.84 Such statements can occur spontaneously, 
without menacing intent, and are considered constitutionally protected 
speech.85 
 Legislators seeking to define the offense of cyberharassment must 
balance the First Amendment interests of electronic speakers with the 
protection of victims from genuinely harmful and threatening con-
duct.86 Consequently, federal and state legislatures have adopted cer-
tain mechanisms to reconcile the interests of the victim and alleged 
harasser: (1) an objective or subjective reasonable person test based on 
the victim’s perspective, (2) an objective reasonable person test based 
on the harasser’s perspective, (3) a specific intent element, or (4) some 
combination of the above.87 
B. Statutory Schemes Involving Elements of Reasonableness or Specific Intent 
1. Reasonableness Standard Based on the Victim 
 Several state statutes use an objective “reasonable victim” standard, 
which requires the factfinder to determine whether the defendant’s 
actions would have caused a reasonable person to suffer serious incon-
venience, emotional distress, or fear of bodily injury to themselves or 
their family members.88 
                                                                                                                      
situation would not be alarmed, annoyed, or harassed by the defendant’s 
conduct. 
910 P.2d at 220. 
84 See Wolak et al., supra note 28, at S52, S57. In one study involving ten- and seventeen-
year-olds, the majority of online harassment incidents were not found to be distressing. Id. 
at S57. Subjects who visited chatrooms regularly or used the Internet while visiting friends’ 
houses were less likely to be threatened by online harassment, possibly because they had 
become inured to online incivility or felt more secure because of their offline social situa-
tion. Id. 
85 See Volokh, supra note 12, at 422–23 (“This sort of conduct seems less like a deliber-
ately harassing phone call, and more like the annoying words said in public . . . which are 
generally not punishable unless they’re likely to cause a fight.”). 
86 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 133–34, 139. 
87 See infra Appendix. Additionally, more than twenty state criminal laws exempt consti-
tutionally protected activities, such as organized protests, from their purview. See, e.g., Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 817.568 (West 2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (West, Westlaw through 
2007 Sess.); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.2 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sess.). These statutes 
are also noted in the Appendix. See infra Appendix. 
88 See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:12-10(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) (“A person is guilty of 
stalking, a crime in the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course 
of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for 
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 Some scholars criticize this statutory element on the grounds that 
an objective standard discounts the victim’s personal reaction to the 
defendant’s conduct and does not allow the court sufficient flexibility 
to evaluate incidents of cyberharassment on a case-by-case basis.89 Cy-
berharassers seldom make overt threats and often act indirectly, such as 
by inducing third parties to harass the victim for them.90 Additionally, 
many Internet users are accustomed to some measure of unpleasant 
online behavior.91 Depending on the circumstances, conduct that may 
seem innocuous to the judicial factfinder may make a particular victim 
feel genuinely frightened, in a way that arguably deserves some remedy 
at law.92 In response to this concern, states such as Arizona, Oklahoma, 
and Nevada supplement their objective “reasonable victim” standard 
with an additional subjective element that requires that the harassing 
conduct actually cause the victim to feel fear, alarm, or emotional dis-
tress.93 
 Conversely, a subjective reasonableness standard that relies on the 
victim’s unique perception of the defendant’s conduct, although taking 
account of the victim’s individual circumstances, could expand the of-
fense to the point of overbreadth.94 In fact, state statutes that have at-
                                                                                                                      
his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress.”); Okla. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 21, § 1173(A)(1) (2002) (“Any person who . . . [w]ould cause a reasonable person or a 
member of the immediate family of that person . . . to feel frightened, intimidated, threat-
ened, harassed, or molested . . . .”). 
89 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 868 (“Stalking is . . . a crime that depends 
on perception, particularly that of the victim.”); Radosevich, supra note 33, at 1384. 
90 See Zeller, supra note 34. 
91 See Wolak et al., supra note 28, at S52, S57. 
92 See Radosevich, supra note 33, at 1384. 
93 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2921 (2010) (defining “harassment” as conduct “that 
would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the 
conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 200.575 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009) (requiring that the defendant’s conduct “actu-
ally causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed”); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 21, § 1173(A)(2) (targeting any defendant who “[a]ctually causes the person be-
ing followed or harassed to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, 
or molested”); see also Cyberbullying and Other Online Safety Issues for Children: Hearing on H.R. 
1966, the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act” and H.R. 3630, the “Adolescent Web Aware-
ness Requires Education Act (AWARE Act)” Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 39 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on Megan Meier Cyberbullying 
Prevention Act and AWARE Act] (statement by Robert M. O’Neil, Director of the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression) (proposing that a specific intent 
element, as well as required proof of impact or harm upon the victim, enhances the effi-
cacy of criminal cyberbullying statutes). 
94 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865 (acknowledging that the United King-
dom’s Prevention of Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.), which defines 
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tempted to define cyberharassment entirely in terms of the victim’s per-
sonal reaction have been invalidated on the grounds that overly subjec-
tive standards may lead to unconstitutional vagueness.95 Although a 
cause of action should be available for victims who have suffered actual 
harm attributable to cyberharassment, legislatures that have chosen an 
objective “reasonable victim” standard likely sought to limit lawsuits by 
exceptionally sensitive individuals.96 Furthermore, purely offensive 
speech or profanity has traditionally been afforded protection by the 
First Amendment.97 In order to silence such speech, there must be a 
showing that listeners are captive audiences whose privacy interests have 
been invaded in an intolerable manner, or that the listeners have been 
subjected to unwanted communications in the sanctuary of the home.98 
It could be argued that cyberharassment victims could easily “avert their 
eyes” by turning off the electronic device or simply ignoring the offen-
sive communication.99 The fact that most users tolerate ribald online 
remarks as a matter of course reinforces this point.100 
                                                                                                                      
stalking and harassment according to the victim’s perspective, has raised judicial concern 
regarding its broad scope). 
95 See Karenev v. State, 258 S.W.3d 210, 214, 217 (Tex. App. 2008) (ruling that a provi-
sion of Texas’s harassment statute, which prohibited the transmission of electronic com-
munications in a manner “reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, em-
barrass, or offend,” was void for vagueness because the prohibited standard of conduct 
depended on each complainant’s individual sensitivity), rev’d on other grounds, 281 S.W.3d 
428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890, 895 (Wash. 2001) (ruling that 
part of Washington’s harassment law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad due to 
the statue’s reliance on an inherently subjective standard regarding the effect of the de-
fendant’s conduct upon the victim’s “mental health”); see also City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 
992 P.2d 496, 502 (Wash. 2000) (“This court has invalidated criminal laws for vagueness 
when they are overly subjective.”). 
96 See Bryan, 910 P.2d at 220. 
97 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere presence of un-
witting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech ca-
pable of giving offense.”). 
98 See id.; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). 
99 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (determining that individuals in a courthouse could have 
simply averted their eyes in order to avoid seeing the defendant’s offensive message). But 
see Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a Constitutional 
Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of Communication, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 
477, 498–99 (2007) (arguing that it is not possible to avert one’s eyes from violent or inde-
cent electronic communications because the Internet has become a function of everyday 
life and users, particularly minors, sitting at computer screens could be considered a cap-
tive audience). 
100 See Wolak et al., supra note 28, at S57; supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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2. Reasonableness Standard Based on the Alleged Harasser 
 Several states, including Minnesota, New Hampshire, Tennessee, 
and Utah employ an objective “reasonable harasser” standard based on 
whether the defendant knew or should have reasonably known that his 
or her actions would cause an individual emotional distress or fear for 
his or her safety.101 
 This standard is sometimes preferred over a specific intent ele-
ment because it provides sufficient notice to the defendant that his or 
her conduct may be illegal without imposing an overwhelming eviden-
tiary burden on the government.102 Furthermore, it recognizes that a 
victim may suffer psychological harm regardless of whether the defen-
dant actually intended to cause that harm.103 Minnesota’s harassment 
and stalking statute explicitly favors an objective “reasonable harasser” 
approach over specific intent for these reasons.104 
 Nevertheless, statutes that feature a “reasonable harasser” standard 
have been disparaged by legal scholars who believe that harassment laws 
should focus on the impact on the victim, who is mentally and perhaps 
physically harmed as the result of the offense, as opposed to the con-
duct of the harasser.105 Statutes using this standard also could be subject 
to First Amendment challenges based on overbreadth.106 For example, 
in 2008, the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Johnson invalidated a 
provision of Oregon’s harassment statute that criminalized public insults 
                                                                                                                      
101 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (West 2009) (“[‘Harass’] means to engage in 
intentional conduct which: (1) the actor knows or has reason to know would cause the 
victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or 
intimidated; and (2) causes this reaction on the part of the victim.”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 633:3-a (2007) (targeting conduct that the actor knows will place an individual in fear for 
his or her personal safety or the safety of his or her family); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308 
(2010) (prohibiting communication, without legitimate purpose, “[i]n a manner the de-
fendant knows, or reasonably should know, would frighten, intimidate or cause emotional 
distress to a similarly situated person of reasonable sensibilities”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing that a person is guilty of stalking where he or she 
“knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person” to 
fear for his or her safety or experience emotional distress). 
102 See Merschman, supra note 13, at 270. 
103 See id. at 287. 
104 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749(1a) (“In a prosecution under this section, the state 
is not required to prove that the actor intended to cause the victim to feel frightened, 
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated . . . .”). 
105 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 146–47. 
106 See State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 667–69 (Or. 2008) (“Taunts intended and likely 
to produce a violent response are not limited to playgrounds and gang disputes. They 
extend to political, social, and economic confrontations . . . and thus include a wide range 
of protected speech.”). 
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using “abusive words or gestures in a manner intended and likely to 
provoke a violent response,” as facially overbroad because the statute 
could be extended to political disputes and other protected speech.107 
3. Specific Intent 
 Section 223 of the CDA and several state laws, including Arkansas, 
Iowa, and Pennsylvania, require the harasser to act with intent to harass, 
annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass the victim.108 Specific intent 
is associated with the offense’s mens rea and most often targets “pur-
poseful,” “willful,” or “knowing” behavior.109 Specific intent is an effi-
cient means of identifying culpable behavior that should be sanctioned 
in criminal law.110 Statutes containing specific intent elements are also 
more likely to be considered conduct based rather than purely speech 
based, and would therefore be more likely to withstand an overbreadth 
challenge under the First Amendment.111 
 Nonetheless, this element has been criticized because of the heavy 
burden it places upon the state to show the requisite intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt.112 Cyberharassers engage in threatening conduct 
based on any number of motives that can be impossible for the prose-
cution to identify.113 This evidentiary requirement is further compli-
cated when the defendant has no previous relationship with the victim 
or is physically located a great distance away, and therefore seemingly 
lacks the intent or ability to follow through with threats made online.114 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006) (“Whoever . . . makes a telephone call or 
utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication en-
sues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any 
person . . . .”); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-41-108 (2006) (“A person commits the offense of un-
lawful computerized communications if, with the purpose to frighten, intimidate, threat-
en, abuse, or harass another person . . . .”); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4) (LexisNexis 
2009) (“A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no 
intent of legitimate communication . . . .”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2010) (“A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, 
annoy, or alarm another . . . .”). 
109 See Radosevich, supra note 33, at 1385. 
110 See Jefferson & Shafritz, supra note 69, at 338 (“It seems appropriate to address 
computerized communications that are intended to threaten, harass, intimidate and harm 
individuals given the widespread use of computers and the Internet.”). 
111 See Barton, supra note 81, at 471 n.49, 481. 
112 See Merschman, supra note 13, at 269. 
113 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865 (“[A] requirement that the prosecu-
tion prove an intent to stalk would emasculate the law because many stalkers harass their 
victims not out of malevolent intent but from other motives.”). 
114 See Radosevich, supra note 33, at 1384–85. 
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4. Combination Statutes 
 The majority of statutes employ a combination of the aforemen-
tioned elements, typically combining specific intent and some kind of 
reasonableness standard.115 It is frequently unclear, however, whether 
the reasonableness standard is based on the perspective of the victim or 
the harasser, particularly if the statute merely prohibits conduct that is 
“likely” to cause harm.116 Some states, such as California and Missouri, 
merge intent and reasonableness requirements by targeting defendants 
who act “with intent to place the victim in reasonable fear.”117 
                                                                                                                      
115 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006); Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-11-8 (LexisNexis 2005); 
Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (West 2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411s (West 2004). 
One of Michigan’s cyberharassment statutes, which includes an objective and subjective 
reasonable victim requirement, an objective reasonable harasser requirement, and a spe-
cific intent element, provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person shall not post a message through the use of any medium of 
communication, including the internet or a computer, computer program, 
computer system, or computer network, or other electronic medium of 
communication, without the victim’s consent, if all of the following apply: 
(a) The person knows or has reason to know that posting the message could 
cause 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts of unconsented contact with 
the victim. 
(b) Posting the message is intended to cause conduct that would make the 
victim feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or mo-
lested. 
(c) Conduct arising from posting the message would cause a reasonable per-
son to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimi-
dated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 
(d) Conduct arising from posting the message causes the victim to suffer 
emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested. 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411s(1)(a)–(d). 
116 See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-11-8(b)(1)(a) (“A person commits the crime of har-
assing communications if, with intent to harm or alarm another person, he or she . . . 
communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise . . . in a manner likely to harass or 
cause alarm.”); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-182b (West 2007) (“A person is guilty of har-
assment in the first degree when, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm or terrorize an-
other person, he . . . communicates such threat . . . in a manner likely to cause annoyance 
or alarm . . . .”); N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1)(a) (McKinney 2008) (“A person is guilty of 
aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, 
or alarm another person, he or she . . . communicates with a person, anonymously or oth-
erwise . . . in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm . . . .”); see also Long v. State, 931 
S.W.2d 285, 289, 290 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that the language “reasonably 
likely,” standing alone, does not indicate an objective reasonableness standard and even if 
such a standard were present, it could not save a statute from constitutional challenge if 
the prohibited conduct is too vague or overbroad). 
117 See Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a) (“Any person who willfully, maliciously, and re-
peatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a 
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 Combination statutes feature both the benefits and drawbacks of 
their constituent parts.118 The Interstate Stalking Act includes a specific 
intent and a reasonable victim standard;119 yet, the usefulness of the Act 
is limited by the weakness of its specific intent element.120 According to 
the National Center for Victims of Crime, the Act’s requirement that 
the harasser intend to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily harm presents a significant evidentiary burden to the 
government and has led to few federal prosecutions to date.121 
 The Appendix to this Note documents current state and federal 
statutes that could apply to cyberharassment and their constituent ele-
ments.122 Statutes that include requirements of specific intent and ob-
jective reasonableness standards from the victim’s perspective are the 
most common, whereas laws incorporating subjective “reasonable vic-
tim” or objective “reasonable harasser” requirements are less so.123 Nev-
ertheless, these statutory schemes, even working in combination, may 
be inadequate to address the few remedies available to the cyberhar-
assment victim as compared to the instantaneous contact, constant ac-
cess, anonymity, and other advantages available to cyberharassers.124 
                                                                                                                      
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety 
. . . is guilty of the crime of stalking.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225 (1999 & Supp. 2010) (de-
fining a “credible threat” as a “threat communicated with the intent to cause the person 
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety”). 
118 See Violence Against Women Act of 1999, Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection Act of 
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1869 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 228 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on Violence Against Women Act and 
Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection Act] (statement by David Beatty, Director of Public 
Policy for the National Center for Victims of Crime). 
119 Id. Section 2261(A) reads in applicable part: 
Whoever . . . 
(2) with the intent— 
(A) to kill, injure, harass, or place user surveillance with intent to kill, injure, 
harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person . . . 
or; 
(B) to place a person . . . in reasonable fear of the death of, of serious bodily 
injury to— 
(i) that person; 
(ii) a member of the immediate family . . . or; 
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person . . . . 
Id. 
120 See Hearing on Violence Against Women Act and Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection 
Act, supra note 118, at 228. 
121 Id. 
122 See infra Appendix. 
123 See infra Appendix. 
124 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
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Therefore, a different statutory strategy is needed in order to effectively 
curtail cyberharassment while respecting each party’s lawful rights.125 
Some state and foreign stalking and harassment statutes already incor-
porate another legal mechanism that could be effective in this regard: 
burden-shifting devices.126 
III. An Alternative Strategy: Statutory  
Burden-Shifting Devices 
 In light of the limitations of existing statutory schemes, allocating 
evidentiary burdens differently between the parties through burden-
shifting devices, such as affirmative defenses and nonmandatory pre-
sumptions, could be an effective means of reconciling the heavy evi-
dentiary burden placed upon government prosecutors and victims, the 
free speech rights of online speakers, and the uniquely anonymous and 
dangerous nature of cyberharassment.127 In Part III.A, this Note exam-
ines the procedural aspects of affirmative defenses and presumptions in 
criminal law and their relevant constitutional analyses.128 Part III.B then 
discusses the practical and policy implications of nonmandatory bur-
den-shifting devices, and advocates for the use of such devices in cyber-
harassment statutes.129 Finally, Part III.C surveys existing state and for-
eign statutes that feature burden-shifting elements, and identifies 
statutory models that states should emulate when drafting these statutes 
in order to withstand First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.130 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Hearing on Violence Against Women Act and Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection 
Act, supra note 118, at 228; Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865; Radosevich, supra 
note 33, at 1384–85; Merschman, supra note 13, at 269. 
126 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438 (2007 & Supp. 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 750.411h, .411i (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-8-213, 45-5-220 (2009); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1173 (2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
315 (2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 
(West 2009); Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.). 
127 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42, 357 (1995); Miller et 
al., supra note 52, at 82; Wolak et al., supra note 28, at S52. 
128 See infra notes 131–164 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 165–221 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 222–257 and accompanying text. 
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A. Procedural Aspects of Burden-Shifting Devices and Propriety  
Under the Constitution 
 Burden-shifting devices are a common feature of civil and criminal 
law that reallocate the burden of production,131 the burden of persua-
sion,132 or both133 from the prosecution to the accused with regard to 
an element of the offense or to mitigate liability.134 Burden shifting is 
typically embodied in two types of procedural devices: affirmative de-
fenses and presumptions.135 
 Affirmative defenses place the evidentiary burden on the accused 
to come forward with exculpatory facts to limit or negate his or her 
criminal liability, even if the prosecution has successfully demonstrated 
the elements of the offense.136 These defenses, which are included in 
many modern criminal statutes, can shift the burden of production, the 
burden of persuasion, or both to the accused.137 Although some aca-
demics debate whether affirmative defenses are consistent with the 
criminal standard of proof—guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—these 
devices have not been subjected to significant criticism on constitu-
tional grounds.138 
                                                                                                                      
131 Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of 
Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 308, 308, 310 
(1986). The party bearing the burden of production has the obligation of raising an issue 
and presenting sufficient evidence to get to the jury. Id. If the party cannot meet its bur-
den of production, the judge will resolve the issue against that party via directed verdict. 
Id. 
132 Id. The party bearing the burden of persuasion, typically the government in a crim-
inal proceeding, has the responsibility of convincing the factfinder of the truthfulness of 
that party’s assertions. Id. Whether a party has satisfied its burden of persuasion is deter-
mined after the factfinder considers all available evidence against the proper standard of 
proof; if the factfinder remains uncertain, the issue is resolved against that party. John 
Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in Crimi-
nal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1329 n.8 (1979). Devices that assign the burden of persuasion 
are sometimes called “assumptions.” See Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presump-
tions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases, 79 Yale L.J. 165, 173 (1969). 
133 See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 173. The term “burden of proof” is often 
used imprecisely and may refer to either or both the burdens of production and persua-
sion. Id. For the purposes of this Note, “burden of proof” generally refers to both burdens, 
and the individual burdens are specifically identified. 
134 Harris, supra note 131, at 314. 
135 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1327. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 1329–30. 
138 See id. at 1335, 1336; Peter D. Bewley, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Crimi-
nal Presumptions, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 341, 343 n.21 (1970) (“The import of the language ap-
pears to be that a procedure shifting to the defendant the burden of proof on an element 
of the crime would be unconstitutional, while one putting the burden of proof of an af-
firmative defense on him is not.”). 
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 Presumptions allow one fact to be inferred by evidence of another 
and are also widely used as burden-shifting devices.139 They are particu-
larly prevalent in statutes targeting the possession of weapons, alcohol, 
narcotics, or other areas of heightened public and legislative con-
cern.140 Although the terminology used to differentiate between types 
of presumptions varies, the U.S. Supreme Court officially recognized 
two categories of presumptions in its 1979 decision in County Court v. 
Allen: mandatory presumptions and nonmandatory presumptions.141 
Mandatory presumptions, also called “true” or “conclusive” presump-
tions, require the factfinder to draw an inference from available evi-
dence unless the defendant can rebut it.142 Nonmandatory presump-
tions, also called “permissive presumptions” or “permissive inferences,” 
allow the factfinder to infer one fact from proof of another, but the 
presumption is not compulsory.143 Presumptions are also classified ac-
cording to whether they shift the burden of production or the burden 
of persuasion.144 
 Unlike affirmative defenses, presumptions have been attacked on 
constitutional grounds since the nineteenth century and the Supreme 
Court has in fact deemed certain kinds of presumptions as unconstitu-
tional per se.145 In 1975, the Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur that pre-
                                                                                                                      
139 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1304 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “presumption” as “[a] 
legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of 
some other fact or group of facts”); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1327. Although 
prevalent in statutory law, the very nature of presumptions is contested; they have been 
characterized as rules of law, procedure, evidence, or a combination of all three. See Julian 
P. Alexander, Presumptions: Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (1945). 
140 See Allen Fuller & Robert Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutory Pre-
sumptions That Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 420, 420 (1971); 
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1326, 1335; see, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 
398, 400 (1970) (heroin); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 9 (1969) (marijuana); United 
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 64 (1965) (alcohol); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 
137 (1965) (alcohol); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943) (firearms). 
141 See 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (dividing presumptions and inferences into two cate-
gories: permissive and mandatory). 
142 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 4–5; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1335. 
Some legal scholars distinguish “conclusive” presumptions from mandatory presumptions, 
defining the former as foreclosing any further argument once certain facts are shown. See 
Neil S. Hecht & William M. Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. 
Rev. 527, 529 (1978); Bewley, supra note 138, at 342. 
143 See Harris, supra note 131, at 310; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1335–36; 
Bewley, supra note 138, at 343. This classification of presumptions is complicated further 
by the practice of some courts to construe presumptions with mandatory language as if the 
presumption were not required. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1335–36. 
144 See Bewley, supra note 138, at 343. 
145 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a re-
buttable presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant, on the 
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sumptions that transfer the burden of persuasion to the defendant vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.146 The 
Court has also criticized mandatory presumptions, in dicta, as violative 
of the defendant’s right to have a trial jury consider all elements of an 
offense, on the grounds that mandatory presumptions compel (rather 
than permit) the factfinder to draw inferences from proven evidence.147 
 In the aftermath of Mullaney, only rebuttable, nonmandatory pre-
sumptions that affect the burden of production are permissible in crim-
inal law.148 Consequently, only this category of presumption has further 
utility for cyberharassment statutes.149 Rebuttable, nonmandatory pre-
sumptions allow the prosecution to introduce prima facie evidence that 
switches the burden of production to the defendant to produce suffi-
cient evidence to invalidate the presumption.150 If the presumption is 
successfully rebutted, the burden of production shifts back to the prose-
cution to fully prove the fact at issue.151 If the defendant cannot over-
                                                                                                                      
grounds that due process requires the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt); Harris, supra note 131, at 308. 
146 See 421 U.S. at 703. 
147 See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521–23 (1979) (quoting United States 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 446 (1978)) (“[A] conclusive presumption in this case 
would . . . ‘invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely 
to the jury.”); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446 (ruling that a conclusive presumption in a 
criminal antitrust action was impermissible because “ultimately the decision on the issue of 
intent must be left to the trier of fact alone”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 
(1952) (“A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively 
eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense.”). 
Under these analyses, a presumption that if A and B are proved, then C is also proved, 
violates due process because the jury is not given the choice of whether to infer C. See Ash-
ford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 175. This reasoning remains unchanged even if the 
defendant is given the opportunity to rebut the mandatory presumption because if the 
defendant fails to invalidate the presumption, the disputed fact is nevertheless resolved 
automatically against him or her. See id. This results in the equivalent of a directed verdict 
against the accused, which is impermissible in criminal law. See Bewley, supra note 138, at 
343. 
Additionally, presumptions that operate in an unreasonable or capricious manner or 
circumvent substantive constitutional rights violate due process requirements under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911) (“The 
power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.”); 
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (“[T]he in-
ference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely 
arbitrary mandate.”). 
148 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703–04; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 142, at 529; Bewley, 
supra note 138, at 343. 
149 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703–04; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 142, at 529; Bewley, 
supra note 138, at 343. 
150 See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 174. 
151 See id. 
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come the presumption, the factfinder is given the option to infer the 
existence of the presumed fact from the facts already proven.152 Criti-
cally, however, even presumptions that survive the Mullaney standard 
must also satisfy two additional constitutional tests to comply with due 
process: (1) the rational connection test, as first introduced by the Su-
preme Court in the 1910 case of Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad 
Co. v. Turnipseed, and (2) the comparative convenience test, as articu-
lated by the Court in the 1934 case of Morrison v. California.153 
 The rational connection test is considered the dominant analysis 
for determining the constitutionality of nonmandatory presumptions.154 
When first formulating the test in Turnipseed, the Supreme Court held 
that a legislative presumption does not violate due process or equal 
protection requirements so long as there is some rational connection 
between the fact proved and the fact presumed.155 Additionally, the 
party against whom the presumption operates must not be precluded 
from presenting his or her own evidence for the purpose of rebuttal.156 
The rational connection test was subsequently refined in the Supreme 
Court’s 1969 decision in Leary v. United States, where the Court deter-
mined that a presumption satisfies the rational connection test if “it can 
at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is 
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to 
depend.”157 
                                                                                                                      
152 See id. 
153 See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88–91 (1934); Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43. 
The U.S. Supreme Court also proposed a third due process test for presumptions in its 
1928 decision Ferry v. Ramsey, termed “the greater includes the lesser” rule. See 277 U.S. 88, 
94 (1928). The reasoning behind this rule is as follows: if the legislature could constitu-
tionally punish a crime featuring elements A and B, a statute that permits element C to be 
presumed from elements A and B is also constitutional because this presumption provides 
the defendant with an opportunity to escape conviction even if A and B are proven. See id.; 
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 177. This is because the permissible inference of 
element C can be rebutted. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 177. In comparison 
to the rational connection and comparative convenience tests, however, commentators 
consider the “greater includes the lesser” theory defunct because the Supreme Court de-
clined to apply the rule in the 1965 decision United States v. Romano, instead employing the 
rational connection test. See 382 U.S. at 144; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 178. 
154 See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 166. 
155 219 U.S. at 43. 
156 Id. 
157 395 U.S. at 36 (ruling unconstitutional, under the rational connection test, a crim-
inal statutory presumption that authorized the jury to infer from a defendant’s possession 
of marijuana that the marijuana had been imported into the United States illegally and 
that the defendant knew of the unlawful importation). Some commentators disapprove of 
the rational connection test, alleging that it disregards substantive issues in favor of a for-
malistic, empirical search for a logical connection between proven and presumed facts. See 
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 The second constitutional test for presumptions, the comparative 
convenience test, acts as a corollary or threshold analysis for the ra-
tional connection test.158 Justice Cardozo first introduced the compara-
tive convenience analysis in Morrison, which allowed the burden of 
proof to be transferred to the defendant if the inconvenience to the 
defendant is less than the benefit to the prosecution.159 In Morrison, 
Justice Cardozo reasoned: 
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and 
fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in 
criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are 
in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to 
make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has 
been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon 
a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowl-
edge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to 
the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or op-
pression.160 
The Morrison Court may have been influenced by the views of evidence 
scholar John Henry Wigmore, who envisioned presumptions as devices 
for distributing, instead of satisfying, burdens of proof.161 Pursuant to 
this test, burden shifting is permissible and even proper where there are 
significant disparities in convenience of proof and opportunities for 
knowledge between the parties.162 The combination of the comparative 
convenience and rational connection tests implies that a court will be 
less critical of the connection between the state’s evidence and the pre-
sumed fact if the circumstances are such that the prosecution would be 
seriously disadvantaged by an obligation to affirmatively support the 
presumption.163 Although a corollary test, the comparative convenience 
rule remains relevant in the constitutional analysis of presumptions and, 
as discussed in Part III.B, parallels issues inherent in cyberharassment 
                                                                                                                      
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 166–67; Harris, supra note 131, at 328–29; 333–34; 
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1396. 
158 See Tot, 319 U.S. at 467; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 180. 
159 See 291 U.S. at 88; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 168. 
160 291 U.S. at 88–89 (emphasis added). 
161 Harris, supra note 131, at 320–21; see Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88–89 (citing 5 John 
Wigmore, Evidence 2486, 2512 (2d ed. 1923)). 
162 See Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90–91. 
163 Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 168. 
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cases; namely, the inequality of information and “opportunities for 
knowledge” between cyberharassers and their victims.164 
B. Comparative Convenience and Fundamental Fairness: Burden-Shifting 
Devices as Balancing Mechanisms 
 Notwithstanding the constitutional scrutiny imposed under Mul-
laney and the rational connection and comparative convenience tests, 
statutory burden-shifting devices have the greatest utility for offenses 
where the legislature believes that it is practical, convenient, and fair to 
lessen the initial burden of proof required from the state.165 This bur-
den is then transferred to the accused to present evidence in order to 
rationalize his or her actions.166 
 Affirmative defenses and nonmandatory presumptions are well 
suited for ameliorating the evidentiary difficulties that make cyberhar-
assment cases so arduous for victims and government prosecutors, con-
sistent with their use as vehicles for increased fairness and efficiency in 
other areas of the criminal law.167 State and federal legislatures should 
increase the efficacy of their cyberharassment laws by supplementing 
typical statutory elements, such as standards of reasonableness and spe-
cific intent, with nonmandatory burden-shifting devices that reallocate 
part of the burden of proof to the defendant.168 Such devices would 
better account for the realistic difficulties of obtaining proof of anony-
mous or pseudononymous harassment and balance the interests of 
both parties by providing justice for victims without compromising the 
free speech or due process rights of the accused.169 In order to weigh 
the merits of this theory, a more detailed review of the practical advan-
tages and disadvantages of burden shifting is necessary.170 
                                                                                                                      
164 See Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88–91; infra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
165 See Leary, 395 U.S. at 36; Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88. 
166 See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 174; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 
1327. 
167 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Joseph P. Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid 
to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A. J. 287, 287, 288 (1928); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, 
at 1334, 1354; Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persua-
sion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299, 1321, 1335–36 (1977). 
168 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Chamberlain, supra note 167, at 287, 288; Jeffries 
& Stephan, supra note 132, at 1334, 1354; Underwood, supra note 167, at 1321, 1335–36. 
169 See Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88–91; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1355; Miller et 
al., supra note 52, at 82. 
170 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 421–24; Un-
derwood, supra note 167, at 1321, 1323–35. 
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1. Advantages of Burden-Shifting Devices in Cyberharassment Law 
 Burden-shifting mechanisms are useful for facilitating efficient liti-
gation in areas of the criminal law where the prosecution is placed at a 
substantial procedural disadvantage, and have long been used in such a 
way.171 Presumptions and inferences reduce judicial costs by formalizing 
recognized patterns of circumstantial evidence, based on observation 
and experience, in order to establish one related fact from proof of an-
other.172 Burden shifting is commonly employed as an aid for prosecu-
tors where the government must prove criminal elements related to 
state of mind or intent, and such facts lie peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the accused.173 A state’s inclusion of burden-shifting devices 
within criminal statutes indicates a legislative choice to facilitate convic-
tions by easing the prosecution’s burden of proof—the trier of fact is 
permitted to draw certain inferences from a lesser quantum of evidence 
that would not normally meet the standard of proof of beyond a reason-
able doubt.174 Notwithstanding additional due process considerations 
for presumptions, affirmative defenses and presumptions that shift the 
burden of production to the defendant are generally considered ac-
ceptable housekeeping mechanisms for screening out extraneous issues 
and eliciting evidence to which the defendant has special access, without 
substantially increasing the risk of false convictions.175 
 Burden-shifting devices are also justified for reasons of public pol-
icy.176 Such devices encourage reform of penal law and grant legisla-
tures greater leeway in the statutory definition of crimes, allowing them 
to draft the offense in expansive language in order to sweep in the 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2. 
172 See id. 
173 See id.; Chamberlain, supra note 167, at 288. 
174 See Harris, supra note 131, at 325; Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial 
Sleight of Hand, 53 Va. L. Rev. 702, 702–04 (1967) [hereinafter Judicial Sleight of Hand]. 
Presumptions have been characterized as “an instinctive response to counterbalance the 
expanding constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants by the courts” and 
assist prosecutors in two ways by: (1) allowing prosecutors to avoid demonstrating criminal 
elements that are inherently difficult to establish and in practice, almost impossible to 
prove; and (2) allowing prosecutors to avoid producing evidence that is easily accessible to 
the defendant but extremely inconvenient for the state to obtain. Judicial Sleight of Hand, 
supra, at 702–04. 
175 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1334; Underwood, supra note 167, at 
1335–36; Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 174, at 705. Burden shifting devices that reallo-
cate the burden of production have been employed successfully for defenses such as insan-
ity, duress, entrapment, abandonment, and choice of evils. Underwood, supra note 167, at 
1335–36. 
176 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; see Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 429; Jeffries 
& Stephan, supra note 132, at 1354; Underwood, supra note 167, at 1321. 
2011] Burden-Shifting Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law 317 
maximum number of offenders.177 Burden-shifting mechanisms then 
ameliorate broad legislative drafting by providing an escape hatch, or 
substantive compromise, for less culpable individuals who acted from 
legitimate motives, without fault, or are otherwise unsuitable for crimi-
nal sanctions.178 Consequently, one of the primary benefits of affirma-
tive defenses is their amelioration of the harshness of criminal law and 
their prevention of injustice.179 
 Legal mechanisms that reallocate the burden of proof are of 
greatest use for offenses where the prosecution lacks access to evidence 
involving the defendant’s intent or other facts peculiarly within the de-
fendant’s knowledge.180 It follows that burden-shifting devices could 
effectively be applied to the area of cyberharassment, in which initial 
evidentiary burdens, particularly with regard to the alleged harasser’s 
mental state, can be almost insurmountable for the state, leaving vic-
tims with no legal recourse.181 
 Part of the difficulty of prosecuting technology-savvy harassers is 
the ease with which defendants can harm the victim.182 Cyberharassers 
have the capability to invade the victim’s privacy, destroy his or her rep-
utation, and inflict financial, psychological or even physical harm from 
great distances.183 Additionally, because of statutory disincentives for 
ISP disclosure of IP addresses and harassers’ propensity to supply false 
identification information, anonymous or pseudonymous harassers can 
evade law enforcement with minimal effort.184 
 Victims’ burdens are further compounded if applicable statutes 
employ reasonableness or intent requirements that are extremely pro-
tective of the electronic marketplace of ideas and the defendant’s 
speech and due process rights.185 Courts’ reluctance to exclude offen-
                                                                                                                      
177 See Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 429; Underwood, supra note 167, at 1321. But 
see Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 191 (arguing that the definition of a crime 
should not be so broad that large numbers of individuals fall into the exceptions to liability 
generated by affirmative defenses, as the criminal law should discourage not only unlawful 
conviction, but also the erroneous arrest and trial of innocent persons). 
178 See Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 429; Underwood, supra note 167, at 1321. 
179 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1354. 
180 See Harris, supra note 131, at 325; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1334; Un-
derwood, supra note 167, at 1335; Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 174, at 703–04. 
181 See Harris, supra note 131, at 325; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1334; Un-
derwood, supra note 167, at 1335; Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 174, at 703–04. 
182 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23. 
183 See id. 
184 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23; Miller et 
al., supra note 52, at 82. 
185 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865. 
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sive communications, group defamation, and hate speech from First 
Amendment protection to preserve the autonomy of even unpopular 
speakers indicates the extent of judicial abhorrence to nearly all forms 
of censorship, regardless of whether the regulated speech is low in so-
cial value.186 Consequently, the constitutional analysis in cyberharass-
ment cases is inherently protective of the harasser.187 Only where 
speech escalates to the level of intimidation or threats that places the 
victim in genuine fear of bodily harm do the safety interests of the vic-
tim override the speaker’s right to free expression.188 
 Many state and federal legislatures have encountered difficulty in 
drafting criminal cyberharassment statutes precisely because the scope of 
possible conduct is so broad and may include constitutionally protected 
speech.189 Expansive statutes that sweep in antisocial but expressive con-
duct, such as online taunting between classmates, will likely be invali-
dated for overbreadth or vagueness.190 Such actions are legally permissi-
ble and at worst, better addressed by guardians, schools, and even civil 
courts rather than the criminal justice system.191 Statutes that are worded 
too narrowly, however, will not be effective against nontraditional but 
                                                                                                                      
186 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech 
does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce 
them into action.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Feiner v. New York, 340 
U.S. 315, 331 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[S]peakers need police protection. If they 
do not receive it . . . the police become the new censors of speech. Police censorship has 
all the vices of the censorship from city halls which we have repeatedly struck down.”); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“To persuade others to his own point of 
view, the pleader . . . resorts to exaggeration, to vilification . . . and even to false statement. 
But . . . these liberties are . . . essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the 
part of the citizens of a democracy.”). 
187 See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 910; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; Cantwell, 310 
U.S. at 310. 
188 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (“Intimidation . . . is a type of true 
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of 
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
707–08 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be distinguished from what is consti-
tutionally protected speech.”); Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985)) (“Prohibiting harassment is not pro-
hibiting speech, because harassment is not a [sic] protected speech. Harassment is not 
communication, although it may take the form of speech.”). 
189 See Hearing on Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act and AWARE Act, supra note 93, 
at 23 (statement of Hon. Linda T. Sánchez) (“I want the [Megan Meier Cyberbullying Pre-
vention Act] to be able to distinguish between an annoying chain email, a righteously an-
gry political blog post, or a miffed text to an ex-boyfriend—all of which should remain 
legal; and serious, repeated, and hostile communications made with the intent to harm.”). 
190 See State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 668 (Or. 2008). 
191 See Dickerson, supra note 22, at 70–74; Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 866. 
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dangerous means of online harassment, such as stalking by proxy.192 
Burden-shifting mechanisms allow greater leeway in statutory drafting 
for sui generis offenses like cyberharassment because they expand the 
reach of the statute to encompass many forms of harassment without in-
creasing the risk of constitutional invalidation or false conviction.193 Ad-
ditionally, presumptions and affirmative defenses can be easily tailored to 
particular offenses, which makes them well suited to “upgrade criminal 
procedures” in response to constantly evolving cybercrimes.194 
 Incorporation of burden-shifting devices within cyberharassment 
statutes also makes sense on a policy level.195 In fact, the practical con-
cerns of cyberharassment cases mirror the issues that gave rise to Justice 
Cardozo’s comparative convenience test for presumptions in Morri-
son.196 Where convenience of proof and opportunities for knowledge 
vary greatly between the prosecution and the defense, the legislature 
may permissibly transfer a portion of the burden of proof in order to 
balance the interests of both parties.197 This process is not for the pur-
pose of obtaining convictions more easily or quickly, but instead to fa-
cilitate more efficient prosecution and impose criminal sanctions upon 
sufficiently culpable parties where the prosecution might otherwise be 
exceedingly difficult due to lack of available information.198 This Note 
does not advocate for a prosecution-oriented approach to cyberharass-
ment.199 Rather, it recognizes that cyberharassment victims are already 
at a significant disadvantage when attempting to identify their harass-
                                                                                                                      
192 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 132, 140; Zeller, supra note 34. 
193 See Harris, supra note 131, at 325; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1334; Un-
derwood, supra note 167, at 1335–36; Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 174, at 702–04. 
194 See Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 174, at 702. 
195 See Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88–91. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 90–91. 
198 See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 132, at 186; Bewley, supra note 138, at 354. 
199 Cf. Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 427; Bewley, supra note 138, at 354–55. These 
commentators view presumptions as an unconstitutional, accusatorial shortcut that gives 
short shrift to the criminal defendant and due process in favor of easing the burden on 
prosecutors and the criminal justice system. See Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 427; Bew-
ley, supra note 138, at 354–55. This view has been stated by jurists as well, such as Justice 
McReynolds in his dissent to the 1928 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Casey v. United States: 
Once the thumbscrew and the following confession made conviction easy; but 
that method was crude and, I suppose, now would be declared unlawful upon 
some ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the prose-
cutor. The victim will be spared the trouble of confessing and will go to his 
cell without mutilation or disquieting outcry. 
276 U.S. 413, 420 (1928) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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ers, let alone prove their intent or state of mind beyond a reasonable 
doubt.200 These elements lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the ac-
cused.201 Sharing evidentiary burdens between victims and defendants 
should harmonize the interests of both sides, rather than overwhelm-
ingly favor one side over the other.202 
2. Disadvantages and Constitutional Objections to Burden-Shifting 
Devices 
 Burden-shifting devices are certainly not perfect. As discussed in 
Part III.A, the use of affirmative defenses and particularly presumptions 
has historically raised issues of constitutionality with regard to due 
process, the constitutional privilege against self incrimination, and the 
right to a trial by jury for the defendant.203 Commentators’ principal 
objection against these devices concerns their reduction of the prose-
cution’s constitutional burden of proving every element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.204 Burden-shifting mechanisms permit cer-
                                                                                                                      
200 See 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 23; Miller et al., supra note 52, at 82. 
201 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Chamberlain, supra note 167, at 287–88. 
202 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Chamberlain, supra note 167, at 287–88. 
203 See Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 421–24. Justice Black enumerated several con-
stitutional arguments against presumptions in his dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1970 opinion in Turner v. United States, including: (1) the defendant’s right not to be com-
pelled to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury; (2) the defendant’s right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him or her; (3) the right not to be compelled to be a wit-
ness against oneself; (4) the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; (5) the defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him or her; (6) the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for one’s defense; 
(7) the right to counsel; and (8) the right to trial by an impartial jury. 396 U.S. at 425 
(Black, J., dissenting). Several of these arguments have since been rejected. See Fuller & 
Urich, supra note 140, at 424. 
Another noteworthy argument against presumptions involves their effect on the deci-
sionmaking roles of the judge and jury and the description of permissible inferences in 
jury instructions, even if the presumption itself satisfies the rational connection test. See 
Harris, supra note 131, at 311. This issue culminated in 1979 in Sandstrom v. Montana, in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court, after discussing Morissette and U.S. Gypsum Co., held that 
whether a presumption is unconstitutional as a mandatory or “conclusive” presumption, or 
a presumption that impermissibly shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant, de-
pends upon a reasonable jury’s interpretation of the jury instructions. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 
at 524. If the instructions have a conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect, then the pre-
sumption is unconstitutional. Id. at 523–24. 
204 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
requires the prosecution to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt of “every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is charged”). When the Supreme 
Court decided In re Winship in 1970, commentators did not consider the decision particu-
larly innovative, as all American courts already employed the criminal standard of proof 
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tain facts to be inferred by the factfinder rather than affirmatively 
proven by the government.205 These devices, commentators argue, cre-
ate an insufficient factual basis for punishment and increase the risk of 
erroneous conviction, which the demanding reasonable doubt stan-
dard was intended to safeguard against.206 
 Jurists and commentators have also criticized the practical benefits 
of presumptions, arguing that judicial efficiency or any evidentiary 
hardship imposed upon the state do not justify shifting the burden of 
proof away from the prosecution.207 Commentators contend that reas-
signing evidentiary burdens may result in a slippery slope: the state 
could theoretically define a crime in extremely general terms and then 
require the defendant to show that he acted without a culpable mental 
state, completely freeing the prosecution from proving mens rea.208 
Shifting the burden to the defendant to justify or excuse his conduct 
could result in disproportionally harsh penalties and substantial injus-
tice.209 Furthermore, the existence of “unusual rules of proof” that real-
                                                                                                                      
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1328 (“As a general 
rule of criminal procedure . . . Winship merely confirmed the status quo.”). Nonetheless, 
Winship ‘s mandate that the reasonable doubt standard be applied to “every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime . . . charged” has significant implications for burden shifting devices, 
which transfer the burden of proof for certain facts onto the accused. See Winship, 397 U.S. 
at 364 (emphasis added); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1333. Theoretically, if Win-
ship were applied to every fact pertaining to a crime, not just its official elements, such a 
purely procedural approach would invalidate all presumptions and affirmative defenses in 
criminal law. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1333, 1344. This interpretation was 
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in 1977 in Patterson v. New York, where the Court 
limited the application of Winship and Mullaney to only those facts identified as formal 
elements of a crime, rather than all facts affecting “the degree of criminal culpability.” See 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 & n.15 (1977). 
205 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 1–2 (“[I]t is logical to consider all presumptions as 
inferences of fact.”); Harris, supra note 131, at 310, 336 (“A presumption is a rule of law 
requiring that once some fact (a ‘basic’ or ‘proven’ fact) is established, some other fact at 
issue (the ‘presumed’ fact) must be deemed true, at least provisionally.”). 
206 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man go free.”); Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 422, 427; Jeffries & Stephan, supra 
note 132, at 1346; Bewley, supra note 138, at 349. 
207 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 702 (“[A]lthough intent is typically considered a fact pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recog-
nized, justify shifting the burden to him.”); Tot, 319 U.S. at 469 (“Nor can the fact that the 
defendant has the better means of information, standing alone, justify the creation of such 
a presumption.”); Bewley, supra note 138, at 355 (“The argument from convenience is, in 
any event, not persuasive since it has never been agreed that an unconstitutional act 
should be permitted because it is more economical.”). 
208 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
209 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1357. 
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locate the burden of proof away from the government may mislead po-
tential offenders as to procedural and substantive aspects of the law, 
raises issues of fair notice, and frustrates the purpose of the criminal 
law as a guide to public conduct.210 
 As with all statutory mechanisms, burden-shifting devices are im-
perfect, but this is insufficient grounds for disregarding them as useful 
tools in cyberharassment litigation.211 Statutory presumptions and infer-
ences are criticized for their conflict with the presumption of innocence 
and other privileges granted by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.212 This criticism, however, operates primarily on a doctrinal level 
with the recognition that affirmative defenses and presumptions, in 
spite of academic misgivings, have long been utilized in penal law and 
are unlikely to be discontinued.213 Objections to burden-shifting devices 
as violations of other constitutional rights beyond due process, such as 
the privilege against self-incrimination, have largely been rejected by 
courts.214 Similarly, contentions that presumptions and defenses lead to 
injustice are subject to equally persuasive counterarguments that pro-
                                                                                                                      
210 Underwood, supra note 167, at 1323–25. But see Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 
1351, 1390–91 (arguing that affirmative defenses have no deceptive effect and that presump-
tions are only confusing to the extent that they qualify language elsewhere in the statute). 
211 See Turner, 396 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting); Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 
421–25; Bewley, supra note 138, at 355. 
212 See Turner, 396 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting); Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 
421–25; Bewley, supra note 138, at 355. 
213 See, e.g., Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (“Every accused per-
son, of course, enters upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence. But that 
presumption may be overcome, not only by direct proof . . . [but also] by the additional 
weight of a countervailing legislative presumption.”); Harris, supra note 131, at 340 n.153 
(“If the defendant does not produce enough evidence to support the claimed defense, a 
verdict is effectively directed in favor of the prosecution. . . . This is more troublesome, 
doctrinally. . . . Nevertheless, this practice will continue.”); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 
132, at 1347 n.62, 1348 (“There is no apparent reason to believe that the symbolic value of 
society’s commitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is in any way impaired by the 
existence of presumptions and affirmative defenses. These devices have existed for a long 
time and have not been widely perceived or popularly condemned as invasions of the pre-
sumption of innocence.”). 
214 See, e.g., Gainey, 380 U.S. at 69–71 (rejecting arguments that a statutory presump-
tion violated the defendant’s right to trial by jury and right against self-incrimination); Yee 
Hem, 268 U.S. at 185 (dismissing a challenge to a statutory presumption based on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598–99 (1904) (declin-
ing to consider the defendant’s argument that possession of gambling paraphernalia as 
prima facie evidence of knowing possession violated due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 424 (“The fact remains, 
however, that [Justice Black’s objections in Turner] have been rarely expressly considered 
and never accepted by the Supreme Court. The only argument which has been subject to 
significant judicial consideration, that presumptive devices violate the protections against 
self-incrimination, is the argument most susceptible to dispute.”). 
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hibiting reallocation of the burden of proof would have equally unde-
sirable effects upon criminal defendants.215 
 Finally, the argument that presumptions and affirmative defenses 
unconstitutionally relieve the state from proving the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt is based on a formalistic interpretation of 
the criminal standard of proof and is not a concern in practice.216 Bur-
den shifting can lighten the evidentiary burden on the prosecution by 
permitting certain facts to be inferred from others for the purpose of a 
prima facie case.217 Beyond this stage, however, the defendant has the 
opportunity to rebut the inferred fact, and the government once again 
bears the full burden of persuasion.218 Presumptions are labor-saving 
devices, but their effect on litigation is limited to initial evidentiary bur-
dens.219 The ultimate decision of whether the state carried its burden of 
persuasion remains with the factfinder.220 Rather than depriving the ac-
cused of his or her constitutional rights, burden-shifting mechanisms 
actually benefit the defendant by providing a statutory defense, whether 
implicit (via presumptions and inferences) or explicit (via affirmative 
defenses), for individuals who fall within the scope of a criminal offense 
but whose conduct does not rise to a sufficient level of culpability.221 
C. Burden-Shifting Devices in Current Cyberharassment Statutes 
 As discussed in Part II.B, the majority of modern cyberharassment 
laws share common elements, but these statutory mechanisms implic-
itly favor one party above the other in litigation because they are 
couched in the perspective of either the victim or the harasser.222 Spe-
cific intent and objective “reasonable victim” standards protect against 
overbreadth and unconstitutional vagueness, but they also weigh in fa-
vor of the defendant because they divert judicial focus away from the 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 132, at 1358–59 (arguing that reallocation of the 
burden of proof is not related to the seriousness of criminal penalties and predicting that 
outlawing burden shifting devices would merely inhibit benevolent legislative reform). 
216 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 17–18; Harris, supra note 131, at 356–57. 
217 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 17–18. 
218 See id. at 18 (“[The plaintiff] may struggle as best he can to reach the haven of the 
prima facie case; he may ‘hitch-hike’ part of the way upon a passing presumption. Once he 
reaches this battle area, however, he should be compelled to fight it out with the only wea-
pons which persuasion allows.”). 
219 See id. at 17–18. 
220 See id. 
221 See Fuller & Urich, supra note 140, at 429. 
222 See Goodno, supra note 1, at 134, 139; Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865; 
Merschman, supra note 13, at 268–69; supra notes 88–126 and accompanying text. 
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victim’s personal response to the harassment and impose heavy eviden-
tiary burdens upon the government.223 In contrast, subjective “reason-
able victim” or “reasonable harasser” standards favor the victim by fo-
cusing primarily on the reasonableness of the offender’s actions, rather 
than the sensitivity of the victim, and by ensuring that the trier of fact 
considers each offense on an individual basis.224 Statutes featuring sub-
jective elements risk being invalidated as unconstitutionally vague, 
however, due to their reliance on the varying and unpredictable mental 
states of the parties involved.225 Because of their ability to balance the 
interests of both parties, burden-shifting devices should compensate for 
the shortcomings of these statutory strategies.226 This Section identifies 
promising models for states to emulate; specifically, the United King-
dom and several U.S. states have already incorporated affirmative de-
fenses and presumptions into their cyberharassment statutes, and these 
statutes have successfully withstood constitutional challenge.227 
1. Affirmative Defenses in Practice 
 One example of affirmative defenses can be seen in the United 
Kingdom’s Protection from Harassment Act of 1997 (PHA).228 Section 
4 of the Act imposes criminal penalties upon individuals whose course 
of conduct places others in fear of violence on more than two occasions 
and employs a reasonableness standard from the perspective of the ha-
rasser.229 Additionally, section 4 contains a burden-shifting device that 
allows the defendant to show evidence pursuant to three affirmative 
defenses, including whether his or her conduct was reasonable for pro-
                                                                                                                      
223 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 863, 865; Merschman, supra note 13, at 
269; Radosevich, supra note 33, at 1384. 
224 See Merschman, supra note 13, at 270, 287. 
225 See Lamplugh & Infield, supra note 77, at 865; Volokh, supra note 12, at 421; Barton, 
supra note 81, at 481–82. 
226 See Alexander, supra note 139, at 2; Chamberlain, supra note 167, at 287–88. 
227 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438 (2007 & Supp. 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 750.411h, .411i (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-8-213, § 45-5-220 (2009); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1173 (2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 
(2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 (West 
2009); Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.); infra notes 228–
257 and accompanying text. 
228 See Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.). 
229 Id. § 4(2) (“[The] person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know 
that it will cause another to fear that violence will be used against him on any occasion if a 
reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of con-
duct would cause the other to so fear on that occasion.”). 
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tecting himself or another, or the property thereof.230 The British Par-
liament originally enacted the PHA to redress traditional forms of stalk-
ing and to resolve doctrinal inconsistencies in the common law; the 
statute’s language, however, is sufficiently broad to encompass many 
types of harassment, both civil and criminal.231 
 Affirmative defenses are rarely explicitly included in U.S. cyber-
harassment law, although states like New Hampshire have employed 
statutory language excepting “constitutionally protected” or otherwise 
lawful activity that could be construed as a defense for which the ac-
cused would bear the burden of proof.232 Additionally, a few states, such 
as Utah, explicitly preclude the defendant from asserting certain de-
                                                                                                                      
230 Id. § 4(3). Section 4(3) of the PHA provides: 
It is a defense for a person charged with an offence under this section to show 
that— 
(a) his course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or de-
tecting crime, 
(b) his course of conduct was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or 
to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under 
any enactment, or 
(c) the pursuit of his course of conduct was reasonable for the protection of 
himself or another or for the protection of his or another’s property. 
Id. The prosecution is not obligated to affirmatively prove that the defendant’s conduct is 
unreasonable before the defendant can invoke the affirmative defense. See Lamplugh & 
Infield, supra note 77, at 864. 
231 Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United Kingdom, Minn. J. 
Int’l L. 247, 274 (2008) (explaining that the PHA has been drafted broadly enough to 
encompass harassment in the workplace, racial harassment, domestic violence, and even 
civil protests). In fact, the statute never conclusively defines the term “harassment,” merely 
including acts like “alarming” or “causing . . . distress” within its ambit. See PHA § 7(2). 
This broad statutory construction, as well as the PHA’s primary emphasis on psychological 
harm as opposed to physical harm or bodily injury, sets this statute apart from most legisla-
tion in the United States. Harthill, supra, at 294. 
232 See State v. Pierce, 887 A.2d 132, 135 (N.H. 2005) (invalidating subdivision 1(f) of 
New Hampshire’s harassment statute and determining that, even if the statutory exception 
for lawful communication or constitutionally protected activity constituted an affirmative 
defense, the statute remained overbroad). In the majority of states with cyberharassment 
laws that exclude constitutionally protected activity, however, the exception does not affect 
the burden of proof and is not crucial to the validity of the statute. See, e.g., State v. Cardell, 
723 A.2d 111, 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (quoting McDade v. State, 693 A.2d 
1062, 1065 (Del. 1997)) (“That vaguely expressed exception from the original statute’s 
reach added nothing of substance. . . . Anyone exercising First Amendment rights . . . can-
not be convicted under the statute ‘even without any specific exception.’”); State v. Ru-
esch, 571 N.W.2d 898, 901–02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“Because [the exception] provides no 
elements of the crime of stalking, it plays no role in the State’s burden of proof at trial.”). 
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fenses like lack of notice or specific intent to cause fear or emotional 
distress.233 
2. Presumptions and Inferences in Practice 
 No U.S. federal legislation that applies to cyberharassment features 
a burden-shifting device in the context of criminal law.234 U.S. state sta-
tutes, however, tend to include nonmandatory presumptions and infer-
ences rather than affirmative defenses.235 Cyberharassment laws in Kan-
sas, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and Washington, upon the establishment of certain facts or 
prima facie evidence, permit the factfinder to presume some element 
of the offense, such as mens rea, specific intent, or actual infliction of 
harassment or fear upon the victim.236 For example, Michigan’s stalking 
law permits the trier of fact to presume the defendant’s conduct caused 
the victim to feel frightened, intimidated, or harassed where the prose-
cution presents evidence that the defendant continued to engage in 
unconsented contact with the victim after being requested by the victim 
to stop.237 Washington’s stalking statute similarly provides that any at-
tempt to contact or follow the victim, after receiving actual notice that 
such contact is unwanted, serves as prima facie evidence of the defen-
dant’s intent to intimidate or harass the victim.238 
 Of the seven states that employ burden-shifting devices, all charac-
terize the device as a presumption except for Vermont’s “disturbing the 
peace” statute, which provides for a permissible inference of intent to 
                                                                                                                      
233 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(4) (LexisNexis 2008) (“In any prosecution under 
this section, it is not a defense that the actor: (a) was not given actual notice that the 
course of conduct was unwanted; or (b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other 
emotional distress.”). 
234 See Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006); Interstate Stalking 
and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006); Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 223 (2006). The CDA includes affirmative defenses for ISPs and employers, but these 
defenses are only applicable to civil liability and are not available for defendants who actu-
ally initiate or engage in the disputed communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(3), (e). 
235 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438 (2007 & Supp. 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 750.411h, .411i (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-8-213, 45-5-220 (2009); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1173 (2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
315 (2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 
(West 2009); Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.). 
236 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 750.411h, .411i; Mont. 
Code Ann. §§ 45-8-213, § 45-5-220; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 
§ 1173; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027; Wash. Rev. Code 
Ann. § 9A.46.110; Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 25 & 26 Eliz. 2, c. 40 (Eng.). 
237 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411h. 
238 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110. 
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terrify, threaten, harass, or annoy from the defendant’s use of obscene, 
lewd, or lascivious language, threats, or repeated anonymous electronic 
communications.239 Only Kansas and New Hampshire’s stalking statutes 
involve presumptions without indication that the presumption is rebut-
table or provides for only prima facie evidence.240 
 Burden-shifting mechanisms that have been introduced into U.S. 
cyberharassment laws have yet to be successfully challenged on free 
speech or due process grounds.241 In order to preserve this trend, an 
ideal statutory formulation for criminal cyberharassment statutes would 
involve a combination of conventional elements, the aggregate effect of 
which would account for the perspectives of both the victim and the al-
leged harasser.242 For example, one embodiment could include: a spe-
cific intent element paired with an objective “reasonable victim” stan-
dard; an explicit exception for constitutionally protected activity, which 
could either function as clarification of the offense or an affirmative de-
fense; and finally a burden-shifting device, embodied as either an im-
plied affirmative defense or a nonmandatory presumption.243 If a pre-
sumption is employed, the statute should make clear that the 
presumption is noncompulsory, rebuttable, and provides only for prima 
facie evidence of the relevant element of the offense, in order to avoid 
raising constitutional issues from Mullaney and Sandstrom.244 
 Oklahoma’s stalking statute provides an excellent example of a 
cyberharassment law that has effectively supplemented conventional 
statutory elements—in this case, an objective “reasonable victim” stan-
dard, an implied specific intent element, and an exception for constitu-
                                                                                                                      
239 See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027. 
240 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a. 
241 See Staley v. Jones, 108 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (ruling that Michi-
gan’s aggravated stalking statute does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to 
the defendant), rev’d on other grounds, 239 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2001); People v. White, 536 
N.W.2d 876, 884–85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the rebuttable presumption in 
Michigan’s aggravated stalking statute); State v. Saunders, 886 P.2d 496, 497–98 (Okla. 
1994) (ruling that Oklahoma’s stalking statute does not unconstitutionally shift the bur-
den of proof to the defendant). As previously discussed in Part IV.A, in order for a pre-
sumption to be constitutional, it cannot shift the burden of persuasion, must be nonman-
datory, and should satisfy the current version of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rational 
connection test as set forth in Leary, taking into account any substantial inconvenience to 
the prosecution to prove the presumed fact under Morrison’s comparative convenience 
test. See Leary, 219 U.S. at 36; Morrison, 395 U.S. at 88–91. 
242 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173. 
243 See Pierce, 887 A.2d at 135. 
244 See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521–23; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703. 
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tionally protected activities—with a burden-shifting device.245 Under 
the statute, if the prosecution provides evidence that the defendant 
continued to engage in unconsented contact with the victim after being 
requested by the victim to stop, such conduct gives rise to a rebuttable 
presumption that the defendant’s actions resulted in impact or harm 
upon the victim.246 This presumption works in conjunction with the 
statute’s other elements by allowing one requirement of the offense 
(harm to the victim) to be inferred by prima facie evidence of culpable 
behavior within the scope of the statute (repeated following or harass-
ment).247 The statute, however, provides the accused with opportunities 
for exculpation, either by showing that a reasonable person would not 
have been threatened by his or her behavior via the objective “reason-
able victim” standard, demonstrating that the disputed conduct fell 
within the protection of the Constitution or served a legitimate pur-
pose, or by rebutting the presumption that the victim actually felt 
frightened or harassed.248 
 Several aspects of the Oklahoma statute ensure that it strikes the 
proper balance between efficacy and the defendant’s constitutional 
rights, making it an ideal model.249 The specific intent element targets 
only purposeful, culpable behavior deserving of criminal sanctions and 
protects the statute from First Amendment challenges.250 The objective 
“reasonable victim” element likewise avoids an overly subjective stan-
dard that might lead to invalidation for unconstitutional vagueness or 
overbreadth.251 The statutory language specifically describes the bur-
den-shifting mechanism as a “rebuttable presumption,” ensuring that it 
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional for impermissibly shifting 
                                                                                                                      
245 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173; Saunders, 886 P.2d at 497 (reading a specific intent 
element into the Oklahoma stalking statute and determining that the word “repeatedly” 
elucidates that intent). 
246 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173. The relevant statutory language reads: 
Evidence that the defendant continued to engage in a course of conduct in-
volving repeated unconsented contact . . . with the victim after having been 
requested by the victim to discontinue the same or any other form of uncon-
sented contact, and to refrain from any further unconsented contact with the 
victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the continuation of the 
course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimi-
dated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 
Id. 
247 See id. 
248 See id. § 1173(A)(1), (E), (F)(1). 
249 See id. § 1173(E), (F). 
250 See Barton, supra note 81, at 481. 
251 See Volokh, supra note 12, at 421; Barton, supra note 81, at 481–82. 
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the burden of persuasion under Mullaney or imposing a conclusive or 
mandatory presumption.252 Additionally, the statute provides concrete 
examples of “unconsented contact” that could awaken the presump-
tion, thereby notifying potential offenders and lessening the risk of in-
validation under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.253 
 In 1994, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma upheld the 
burden-shifting element of the stalking statute against challenges of 
overbreadth and vagueness in State v. Saunders.254 Applying the rational 
connection test, the court ruled that the rebuttable presumption of 
harm did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defen-
dant because there was a rational connection between the facts proven 
(the continuation of unconsented contact by the accused) and the fact 
presumed (the victim actually feeling frightened or harassed).255 The 
court also defended the stalking statute against allegations of vagueness 
under the Due Process Clause, ruling that its language gave clear and 
fair notice of the proscribed activity and acknowledging that “[a] careful 
balance must be achieved for a statute addressing stalking to be effec-
tive. Stalking statutes must be defined as broadly as possible to maximize 
victim protection, but narrowly enough to prevent serious abuse.”256 Si-
milarly worded statutes featuring rebuttable presumptions, such as 
Michigan’s, have likewise withstood constitutional attacks, indicating 
that burden-shifting devices hold substantial promise for balancing the 
constitutional rights and safety concerns of online speakers and cyber-
harassment victims.257 
Conclusion 
 Cyberharassment statutes that incorporate burden-shifting devices 
have the potential to account for inherent disparities between cyber-
harassers and their victims, where the details of the crime are difficult 
for the state to discover and are typically within only the defendant’s 
knowledge. Although burden shifting is normally considered prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
252 See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521–23; U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446; Mullaney, 421 
U.S. at 703; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 275. 
253 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173(F)(4). 
254 886 P.2d at 497–98. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 497. 
257 See Staley, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 780 (ruling that the rebuttable presumption featured 
in Michigan’s aggravated stalking statute did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of 
proof to the accused); White, 536 N.W.2d at 885 (upholding the rebuttable presumption in 
Michigan’s stalking statute and determining that the ultimate burden of proof for every 
element of the offense remained with the prosecution). 
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tion-oriented, affirmative defenses and rebuttable presumptions can 
function as additional tools for cyberharassment victims and the state in 
a relatively new area of the criminal law, where defendants can easily 
conceal their identities from victims, law enforcement, and even ISPs, 
and elicit evidence relevant to the offense that the accused is in the best 
position to provide. Inferences created by these devices are nonmanda-
tory and thus safely within constitutional bounds; the factfinder may 
accept them only when it is properly persuaded that they are true. Fi-
nally, burden shifting increases fundamental fairness for both parties, 
not only aiding the prosecution, but also creating additional avenues of 
exculpation for nonculpable defendants. Affirmative defenses and pre-
sumptions should therefore be considered legitimate statutory strate-
gies, supplementing specific intent and standards of reasonableness, for 
establishing a balance of convenience for both the victim and the ac-
cused in future state and federal cyberharassment laws. 
Aimee Fukuchi 
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Appendix of Current State and Federal Cyberharassment 
Statutes258 
Current State and Federal Cyberharassment Statutes 
Federal/State Statute Elements 
Interstate Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006). 
(none) 
Interstate Stalking Punishment and 
Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A 
(2006). 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Federal 
Communications Decency Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 223 (2006). 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Affirmative defenses (available 
under section 223(e), primarily for 
ISPs and employers). 
Alabama Ala. Code § 13A-11-8 (LexisNexis 
2005). Harassment or harassing 
communications. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to harass or cause alarm”). 
Alaska Stat. § 11.41.270 (2008). 
Stalking in the second degree. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim (imputed from case 
law: Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451, 
456 (Alaska 2006); Cook v. State, 36 
P.3d 710, 718–19 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2001)). 
Alaska 
Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (2008). 
Harassment in the second degree. 
1) Specific intent. 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2921 
(2010). Harassment; classification; 
definition. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-41-108 (2006). 
Unlawful computerized 
communications. 
1) Specific intent. Arkansas 
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-306 (2006). 
Internet stalking of a child. 
(none) 
Cal. Penal Code § 422 (West 
2010). Elements of offense; 
punishment; “immediate family” 
defined. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (West 
2010). Stalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
California 
Cal. Penal Code § 653m (West 
2010). Telephone calls or contact by 
electronic communication device 
1) Specific intent. 
                                                                                                                      
258 Italicized text denotes burden-shifting elements. 
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with intent to annoy. 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 (2010). 
Harassment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to provoke a violent or 
disorderly response”). 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-182b 
(West 2007). Harassment in the first 
degree: Class D felony. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm”). 
Connecticut 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-183 
(West 2007). Harassment in the 
second degree: Class C 
misdemeanor. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm”). 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1311 (2007 
& Supp. 2010). Harassment; class A 
misdemeanor. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
3) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser. 
District of 
Columbia 
(none) (none) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 817.568 (West 
2006). Criminal use of personal 
identification information. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Florida 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.048 (West 
2007 & Supp. 2010). Stalking; 
definitions; penalties. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Georgia Georgia Code Ann. § 16-5-90 
(2007). Stalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1106 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009). 
Harassment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Hawaii 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1106.5 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009). 
Harassment by stalking. 
1) Specific intent. 
Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7906 (2004).
Stalking in the second degree. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-7.5 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2010). 
Cyberstalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser. 
Illinois 
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 135/1-2 
(West 2010). Harassment through 
electronic communications. 
1) Specific intent. 
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-2-2 
(LexisNexis 2009). Harassment; 
“obscene message” defined. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim (imputed from case 
law: Leuteritz v. State, 534 N.E.2d 
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265, 266--67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Kinney v. State, 404 N.E.2d 
49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)) 
(emphasizing an objective, rather 
than subjective viewpoint)]. 
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 708.7 (West 2003 
& Supp. 2010). Harassment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to cause the other person 
annoyance or harm”). 
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3438 (2007 & 
Supp. 2009). Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Presumption that the defendant acted 
intentionally for any future act, after 
being served with a protective order or 
continuing to engage in stalking after 
being advised by a law enforcement 
officer; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.130 
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2009). 
Definitions for KRS 508.130 to 
508.150. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (West,
Westlaw through 2007 Sess.). 
Stalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Louisiana 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.3 (West,
Westlaw through 2007 Sess.). 
Cyberstalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 210-
A (2006 & Supp. 2009). Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-805 
(LexisNexis 2002). Misuse of 
electronic mail. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43 
(2008). Stalking; punishment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Massachusetts 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43A 
(2008). Criminal harassment; 
punishment. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411h 
(West 2004). Stalking; definitions; 
violation, penalties; probation, term,
conditions; evidence, rebuttable 
presumption; penalty additional. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Rebuttable presumption that 
defendant’s continuation of unconsented 
contact, after being requested by the victim 
to stop, caused the victim to feel terrorized, 
frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Michigan 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411i 1) Objective reasonableness standard 
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(West 2004). Aggravated stalking; 
course of conduct; violation, 
penalties; probation; rebuttable 
presumption. 
based on victim; 
2) Rebuttable presumption that 
defendant’s continuation of unconsented 
contact, after being requested by the victim 
to stop, caused the victim to feel terrorized, 
frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411s 
(West 2004). Posting messages 
through electronic medium without 
consent. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser; 
4) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (West 
2009). Harassment; stalking; 
penalties. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser (explicit statement 
that no proof of specific intent is 
required); 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-45 (2006). 
Obscene electronic 
communications. 
1) Specific intent. Mississippi 
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-45-15 (2006). 
“Cyberstalking”; penalties. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225 (1999 & 
Supp. 2010). Crime of stalking—
definitions—penalties. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Missouri 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090 (1999 & 
Supp. 2010). Harassment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213 
(2009). Privacy in communications. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Rebuttable presumption that 
defendant’s use of lewd or obscene 
language, threats, or lewd and lascivious 
suggestions constitutes prima facie 
evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, 
threaten, harass, annoy, or offend. 
Montana 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-220 
(2009). Stalking—exemption—
penalty. 
1) Attempts to contact the victim after 
actual notice that contact is unwanted 
constitutes prima facie evidence of 
purposeful or knowing harassment of the 
victim; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Nebraska (none) (none) 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.575 1) Specific intent; 
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(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009). 
Stalking: Definitions; penalties. 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:4 (2007 
& Supp. 2009). Harassment. 
1) Specific intent. 
Provision containing possible 
affirmative defense for 
constitutionally protected conduct or 
communication with a lawful 
purpose (section (1)(f)) held 
unconstitutional in State v. Pierce, 
887 A.2d 132, 135 (N.H. 2005), 
unrelated to the existence of the 
defense. 
New Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3-a 
(2007). Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser; 
3) Presumption of knowledge after being 
advised by law enforcement officer or 
served with a protective order; 
4) Exception for conduct “necessary 
to accomplish a legitimate purpose 
independent of making contact with 
the targeted person.” 
5) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-10 (West 
2005 & Supp. 2010). Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
New Mexico (none) (none) 
New York N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 
(McKinney 2008). Aggravated 
harassment in the second degree. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“in a manner 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm”). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196 (2009). 
Using profane, indecent or 
threatening language to any person 
over telephone; annoying or 
harassing by repeated telephoning 
or making false statements over 
telephone. 
1) Specific intent. North Carolina 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196.3 (2009). 
Cyberstalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07 (1997 
& Supp. 2009). Harassment. 
1) Specific intent. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
Menacing by stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Ohio 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.21 
(West 2006). Telecommunications 
harassment. 
1) Specific intent. 
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Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (2002). 
Stalking—Penalties. 
1) Specific intent (imputed from 
case law. State v. Saunders, 886 P.2d 
496, 497 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)). 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Rebuttable presumption that 
defendant’s continuation of course of 
conduct, after being requested by the victim 
to stop, caused the victim to feel terrorized, 
frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested; 
4) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 (2009). 
Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Oregon 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065 (2009). 
Harassment. 
1) Reasonableness standard, 
perspective unclear (“which 
report/threat reasonably would be 
expected to cause alarm”); 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser (section 
(1)(a)(B)) held unconstitutional in 
State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 669 
(Or. 2008). 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2010). 
Harassment. 
1) Specific intent. Pennsylvania 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709.1 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Stalking.
1) Specific intent; 
2) Reasonableness based on victim. 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.2 (West, 
Westlaw through 2008 Sess.). 
Cyberstalking and cyberharassment 
prohibited. 
1) Specific intent (“for the sole 
purpose of harassing that person”); 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(A) 
(2003 & Supp. 2009). Definitions. 
(Harassment in the first degree) 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(B) 
(2003 & Supp. 2009). Definitions. 
(Harassment in the second degree) 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
South Carolina 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(C) 
(2003 & Supp. 2009). Definitions. 
(Stalking) 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-1 
(2004 & Supp. 2010). Stalking as a 
misdemeanor—Second offense a 
felony. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
South Dakota 
S.D. Codified Laws § 49-31-31 
(2004 & Supp. 2010). Threatening 
1) Specific intent. 
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or harassing contacts by telephone 
or other electronic communication 
device as misdemeanor. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308 
(2010). Harassment. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser. 
Tennessee 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 
(2010). Stalking, aggravated 
stalking, and especially aggravated 
stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Rebuttable presumption that that 
defendant’s continuation of contact, after 
being requested by the victim to stop, 
constitutes prima facie evidence that the 
conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized, 
frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech 
Texas Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 
(Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2010). 
Harassment. 
1) Specific intent 
Subjective reasonableness standard 
based on victim (section (a)(7)) held 
unconstitutional in Karenev v. State, 
258 S.W.3d 210, 214, 217 (Tex. 
App. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 
281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2009). 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 
(LexisNexis 2008). Stalking—
Definitions—Injunction—Penalties.
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser. 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027 
(2009). Disturbing peace by use of 
telephone or other electronic 
communications. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Inference of intent from use of lewd, 
lascivious or indecent language or 
repeated anonymous communications. 
Vermont 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1061 
(2009). Definitions. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60 (2009). 
Threats of death or bodily injury to 
a person or member of his family; 
threats to commit serious bodily 
harm to persons on school property;
penalty. 
1) Specific intent. Virginia 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.7:1 
(2009). Harassment by computer; 
penalty. 
1) Specific intent. 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.020 
(West 2009). Definition—Penalties. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Subjective reasonableness standard 
based on victim (section (1)(a)(iv)) 
held unconstitutional in State v. 
Williams, 26 P.3d 890, 895 (Wash. 
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2001). 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.110 
(West 2009). Stalking. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser; 
4) Rebuttable presumption that 
defendant’s continuation of unwanted 
contact or following constitutes prima 
facie evidence of defendant’s intent to 
harass or intimidate. 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.61.260 
(West 2010). Cyberstalking. 
1) Specific intent. 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.14.020 
(West 2002). Definitions. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-3C-14a 
(LexisNexis 2010). Obscene, 
anonymous, harassing and 
threatening communications by 
computer; penalty. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim. 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.0125 (West 
2005). Unlawful use of 
computerized communication 
systems. 
1) Specific intent. Wisconsin 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.32 (West, 
Westlaw through 2005--2006 Sess.). 
Stalking. 
1) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser; 
3) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (2009). 
Stalking; penalty. 
1) Specific intent; 
2) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on victim; 
3) Objective reasonableness standard 
based on harasser; 
4) Exception for constitutionally 
protected speech. 
 
